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I. Introduction
On August 5, 2015, the Gold King Mine spill released millions
of gallons of mining waste from an abandoned mine into the
surrounding ecosystem.1 This spill occurred during an
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigation of the
abandoned Gold King Mine.2 Accumulated mine drainage at the
entrance of the mine unexpectedly gave way, causing a torrent of
water and mining waste to flow into the nearby Cement Creek.3
The waste moved swiftly from Cement Creek into the Animas
River north of Silverton, Colorado, turning the water an opaque
orange color.4 In total, the accident resulted in the release of an
1. See KARLETTA CHIEF ET AL., UNIV. OF ARIZ. SUPERFUND RESEARCH
PROGRAM, UNDERSTANDING THE GOLD KING MINE SPILL 1 (2016) (synthesizing the
information about the Gold King Mine Spill as it emerged).
2.See id. (describing the events that lead to the Gold King Mine spill).
3. See id.
4. See Zoe Schlanger, EPA Causes Massive Spill of Mining Site Water in
Colorado, Turns Animas River Bright Orange, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2015, 3:35
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estimated three million gallons of acid drainage, which ultimately
flowed into the Colorado River.5 The water released from the mine
contained a number of heavy metals, including lead, arsenic,
mercury, and cadmium, that severely polluted the nearby
ecosystems.6
While the Gold King Mine Spill provides an extreme example
of environmental contamination caused by legacy hard rock
mining, the environmental impact of mining is an issue that
extends far beyond the Animas River.7 Thousands of gallons of
pollutants spill into United States waterways from abandoned
mines every minute.8 In fact, there are approximately 23,000
abandoned mines in the state of Colorado alone and approximately
500,000 abandoned mines across the United States.9 While hard
rock mining produces hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of
minerals, the owners of mining sites often abandon the mines once
the minerals are not economically retrievable.10 In some cases,
PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/epa-causes-massive-colorado-spill-1-milliongallons-mining-waste-turns-river-361019 (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) (providing
an account of the Gold King Mine Spill) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
5. See Karletta Chief et al., supra note 1, at 2–3 (“The acid mine drainage
released in the spill contained a number of metals and salts totaling about 190
tons of solids, including several forms of toxic metals such as lead, arsenic,
mercury and cadmium. These solids were mixed in 3,043,067 gallons of water.”).
6. See id. (discussing the repercussions of the Gold King Mine Spill).
7. See Emelie Frojen, Two Years After the Gold King Spill, MEDIUM (Aug.
15, 2015), https://medium.com/@ConservationCO/two-years-after-the-gold-kingspill-2c8a83837d2b (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) (“The amount of pollution that
flowed through Durango during the Gold King Mine Spill still passes down
Colorado waterways every other day; the only difference in the spill was that the
water was orange. This is an issue that extends far beyond the Animas River.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See Ronald Cohen, Weighing the Impact of the Gold King Mine
Spill— and Hundreds of Inactive Mines Like It, CONVERSATION (Aug. 27, 2015,
3:49
AM),
http://theconversation.com/weighing-the-impact-of-the-gold-kingmine-spill-and-hundreds-of-inactive-mines-like-it-46662 (last visited Apr. 7,
2019) (“There are at least 230 inactive mines in Colorado spilling thousands of
gallons per minute into local waterways, according to state officials.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. See Frojen, supra note 7 (discussing the history of hard rock mining in
Colorado and throughout the United States).
10. See STUART BUCK & DAVID GERARD, CLEANING UP MINING WASTE 1 (2001),
https://www.perc.org/wp-content/uploads/old/rs01_1.pdf
(introducing
the
contamination issues associated with hard rock mining).
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such as with the Gold King Mine spill, these abandoned mining
sites have caused environmental, health, and safety problems,
polluting water supplies and affecting nearby residential areas,
fish populations, and wildlife habitations.11 In all, mining waste is
responsible for considerable damage to human health and the
environment.12
In response to the threats hazardous waste poses to public
health and the environment, Congress passed the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA).13 CERCLA provides the EPA with an avenue to compel
responsible parties to clean up abandoned mining sites.14 However,
when looking to remediate sites, the EPA is faced with a number
of challenges.15 At the outset, the EPA must determine who should
be held responsible for the cleanup costs associated with
remediating a contaminated site—often, environmental damage is
caused by companies that ceased operations decades ago or now
lack the financial resources to clean up the waste.16
Many commentators argue that the federal government is an
obvious party to fund the cleanup of contaminated mining sites,
specifically contaminated federal lands. For more than a century,
the federal government failed to regulate mining activity.17 But
11. See id. at 2 (illustrating how severe the damage can be from former
mining operations).
12. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HUMAN HEALTH & ENVIRONMENTAL
DAMAGES FROM MINING AND MINERAL PROCESSING WASTES 1, 7 (1995),
https://archive.epa.gov/epawaste/nonhaz/industrial/special/web/pdf/damage.pdf
(discussing exempt and non-exempt mineral processing wastes).
13. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVITALIZING CONTAMINATED SITES:
ADDRESSING LIABILITY CONCERNS 5 (2008) (providing an overview of the EPA’s
capacity to remediate contaminated lands under CERCLA).
14. See id. at 6 (reviewing CERCLA’s liability provisions).
15. See BUCK & GERARD, supra note 10, at 1–2 (describing the difficulties in
allocating liability for mining operations).
16. See Matthew Brown, U.S. Mining Sites Dump 50 Million Gallons of
Fouled
Wastewater
Daily,
PBS
(Feb.
20,
2019,
12:51
PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/u-s-mining-sites-dump-50-million-gallonsof-fouled-wastewater-daily (last visited Apr. 9, 2019) (discussing pollution caused
by a legacy of mining in the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
17. See id.
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even further, the federal government actively encouraged the
development of economic resources on public lands.18 The General
Mining Law of 187219 authorizes and governs mining activities on
federal lands.20 Congress passed this law for the purpose of
promoting “the development of mining resources in the United
States.”21 The General Mining Law led to extensive mining and
waste disposal activities on federal lands between the late 1800s
and post-World War II.22 During that time, federal agencies kept
the federal government apprised of the extent of waste disposal
occurring on federal lands through field inspections and detailed
reports.23 Despite this knowledge, the federal government took no
steps to control or prevent the contamination.24
In addition, United States agencies have aided in the coal
production process. During World War II, for example, the United
States Production Board and the Departments of Interior and
Agriculture deliberately increased mineral production pursuant to
the General Mining Law.25 The Department of Defense furloughed
thousands of soldiers to work on mines, mills, and process
facilities.26 Additionally, the United States Forest Service funded
the construction of roads for the express purpose of facilitating
18. See Cohen, supra note 8 (“Today, it’s hard to imagine an industry largely
free of responsibility for its actions. But, it happened when the U.S. government
laid out a series of policies for miners to promote western growth and economic
development.”).
19. The General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 22 et seq. (2012).
20. See id. § 22 (“All valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the
United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and
open to exploration and purchase.”).
21. See, e.g., Bagg v. N.J. Loan Co., 354 P.2d 40, 45 (Ariz. 1960) (“No citation
of authority is required to support the statement that the all-pervading purpose
of the mining laws is to further the speedy and orderly development of the mineral
resources of our country.”).
22. See Roger L. Freeman & Pamela S. Sbar, Cleanup on the Federal Lands
Meets the Private Sector, 44 ROCKY MTN. INST. 1, 10–11 (1998),
https://www.dgslaw.com/images/materials/273770.pdf (describing the theories
advanced by the National Mining Association as to why the United States should
be liable under CERCLA).
23. See id. at 11 (recounting the National Mining Association’s arguments).
24. See id. (describing the United States’ extensive involvement in mining
activities on federal lands).
25. See id. (discussing the ways in which the federal government contributed
to the mining contamination).
26. See id.
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mining.27 The United States Bureau of Mines carried out
numerous explorations and drilling programs to expand ore
mineral reserves and increase mineral production.28
Together with private individuals, the federal government
exploited minerals on federal lands.29 The centuries of mining on
federal lands left abandoned mines containing hazardous wastes
littered throughout the country.30 Despite holding fee title to, and
actively encouraging development on, federal lands, the federal
government has attempted to evade CERCLA liability.31 This Note
addresses whether CERCLA extends ownership liability to the
federal government for cleanup costs on contaminated public lands
based on the federal government’s role as the legal titleholder.
Part II begins by providing a brief overview of the background
and goals of CERCLA. Part II also provides an examination of the
issue of ownership liability under CERCLA and recounts the
federal courts’ difficulty in applying ownership liability. Part II
then describes how the federal government’s “bare legal title”
argument arose out of the confusion surrounding ownership
liability in CERCLA litigation. Part III moves on to examine the
recent trend in CERCLA litigation rejecting the federal
government’s bare legal title argument, thus holding the federal
government liable as an owner based on its possession of legal title
to contaminated public lands.
Part IV analyzes whether the bare legal title defense is
consistent with CERCLA, taking the position that the defense is
not. Finally, Part V contends that federal government liability for
its role as titleholder of public lands should extend beyond the
context of contaminated mining lands. Ultimately, this Note
argues that the recent court decisions rejecting the government’s
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Brian Handwerk, Why Tens of Thousands of Toxic Mines Litter the
U.S. West, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/
science-nature/why-tens-thousands-toxic-mines-litter-us-west-180956265/ (last
visited Feb. 26, 2018) (examining how the Gold King Mine spill highlighted the
problems of waste building up in abandoned mines) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
31. See infra Part III (discussing the government’s bare legal title defense).
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bare legal title defense are consistent with CERCLA.32 Courts
should not treat the federal government any differently than a
private entity and, therefore, courts should hold the federal
government liable as an owner under CERCLA for its role as legal
titleholder to public lands.33
II. The History and Legal Framework of CERCLA
In 1980, Congress adopted one of the most extensive
environmental cleanup statutes to date: the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA).34 CERCLA was enacted in response to the alarming
environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution.35
The Love Canal disaster, which has become one of the most
infamous environmental catastrophes to date, illuminated the
need for remedial legislation.36 The discovery of the Love Canal
and several other severely contaminated sites in the late 1970s
sparked public outrage.37 In response, Congress constructed
CERCLA to enable the EPA to clean up thousands of hazardous
wastes sites across the United States.38 Unlike its statutory
predecessors that regulated hazardous wastes,39 Congress
32. See infra Part IV (discussing how rejecting the government’s “bare legal
title” defense will further the remedial and deterrent purposes of CERCLA).
33. See infra Part IV (arguing for a uniform test that holds the federal
government liable based upon roles as a legal title holder of public lands).
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012) (laying the liability framework for the
statute’s remedial goals).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998) (“In 1980,
CERCLA was enacted in response to the serious environmental and health risks
posed by industrial pollution.”).
36. See Dennis Hevesi, The Long History of a Toxic Waste Nightmare, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1998, at B4 (providing a chronological history of the Love Canal
disaster).
37. See id. (rationalizing the policy reasons for enacting CERCLA).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (allocating the authority to respond to the release
or threatened release of hazardous substances to the Executive Branch).
39. See, e.g., id. §§ 6901–92k. Before CERCLA, the Resources Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) was the primary statute that addressed hazardous
waste disposal. However, RCRA “did not authorize the EPA to respond quickly to
the release or threatened release of toxic wastes in an abandoned site. RCRA
regulated only active hazardous waste sites; it did not contemplate abandoned
sites which may jeopardize health.” Elizabeth A. Glass, Superfund and SARA:
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designed CERLCA to be retroactive, rectifying environmental
contamination that had already occurred.40
The overarching goals of CERCLA are two-fold: (1) to promote
the “timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that
the costs of such cleanup efforts are borne by those responsible for
the contamination”41 and (2) to encourage the careful handling of
hazardous wastes in order to prevent future environmental
contamination.42 Through its liability framework, CERCLA
“provide[s] for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency
response for hazardous substances released into the environment
and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.”43
In order to fully understand the question of ownership liability
presented in this Note, it is important to understand the history
and goals of CERCLA, as well as the liability scheme the Act
creates. This Part begins by providing an explanation of the
authority CERCLA grants the EPA followed by a discussion of how
the EPA or a third party may recover costs expended in the
remediation of a contaminated site.
A. The EPA’s Authority Under CERCLA
CERCLA enables the EPA to respond to the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance into the
environment.44 CERCLA delegates the EPA response authority in
Are There Any Defenses Left?, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 385, 388 (1985).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (D. Colo.
1985) (stating that, “CERCLA is by its very nature backward looking. Many of
the human acts that have caused the pollution already had taken place before its
enactment”).
41. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602
(2009) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d
Cir. 2005)).
42. See Daniel C. Chang, CERCLA: The Problems of Limiting Contribution
Claims for Potentially Responsible Parties, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1107, 1008 (2002)
(explaining that one of the main goals of CERCLA is “to encourage the careful
handling of hazardous wastes by spreading liability over all responsible parties”).
43. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 2767 (1980) (codified as amendment at
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012)).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)
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two ways: (1) CERCLA authorizes the cleanup of contaminated
sites; and (2) CERCLA establishes a liability scheme to ensure that
the parties responsible for the contamination pay for the cleanup
at the site.45
In addition, CERCLA established a trust fund called the
Superfund46 meant to finance the remediation of hazardous sites,
or Superfund sites, when the EPA cannot locate responsible
parties or responsible parties are insolvent.47 When the Superfund
was first established,
dedicated taxes placed on polluting
industries and general taxes financed the Superfund.48 However,
CERCLA’s taxing authority expired in 1995.49 Since 2001, general
appropriations constitute the largest source of revenue for the
Superfund.50
In the past decade, the EPA allocated $243 million per year to
Superfund cleanups, but it is estimated that $335 to $681 million
[T]he President is authorized to act, . . . to remove or arrange for the
removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time . . . which the
President deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or
the environment.
The President delegated his response power to the EPA by Executive Order. See
Superfund Implementation, Exec. Order No. 12580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 29,
1987).
45. See Memorandum from the Comm. on Energy and Commerce Democratic
Staff to Members of the Subcomm. on Env’t and on the Econ. (Sept. 9, 2015)
[hereinafter “Hearing on Federal Facility Cleanups under Superfund”] (providing
a background on contaminated sites and CERCLA cleanups).
46. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507(a) (2012) (“There is established in the Treasury of
the United States a trust fund to be known as the ‘Hazardous Substance
Superfund,’ consisting of such amounts as may be—(1) appropriated to the
Superfund as provided in this section.”).
47. See id. (establishing the parameters of the Superfund).
48. See id. § 9607(b) (detailing that the Superfund funding would be
provided by taxes issues on behalf of the Treasury and any funds recovered in
CERCLA actions).
49. See DAVID M. BEARDMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT: A SUMMARY OF
SUPERFUND CLEANUP AUTHORITIES AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE ACT 2 (2012)
[hereinafter “CONGRESSIONAL CERCLA SUMMARY”] (stating that CERCLA’s
“authority to collect the industry taxes expired on December 31, 1995”).
50. See id. (“General revenues now provide most of the funding for the trust
fund, but other monies continue to contribute some revenues (i.e., cost-recoveries
from [potentially responsible parties], fines and penalties for violations of cleanup
requirements, and interest on the trust fund balance).”).
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per year are needed to clean up contaminated sites.51 With such
limited funding, it is important that those responsible for the
contamination, and not the Superfund, bear the costs of the
cleanup.52 Congress passed CERCLA under the theory that those
culpable for the contamination of lands should be responsible for
remediating them.53 As such, CERCLA identifies four categories of
potentially responsible parties (PRPs) that could be held liable to
finance the cleanup of the contaminated site: (1) the present owner
or operator of the contaminated site; (2) any past owner or operator
of the contaminated site at the time the hazardous substance was
disposed of on the site; (3) any generator who arranged to have the
waste taken to the site for treatment or disposal; and (4) any
person who transported the waste for treatment or disposal.54

51. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-380, SUPERFUND:
EPA’s Estimated Costs to Remediate Existing Sites Exceeds Current Funding
2010) (discussing the costs of cleanup at NPL sites).
52. See James Morrow, Owning Up: Determining the Proper Test for
Ownership Liability Under CERCLA, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 333, 335 (2014)
(discussing the EPA’s authority under CERLA).
53. See A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Senate Committee of Environment and
Public Works, S. Doc. No. 97–14, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.1983, Vol. I, p. 320 (stating
that one of the statute's principal goals is “assuring that those who caused
chemical harm bear the costs of that harm . . . .”); United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 257 (3rd Cir. 1992) (“In response to widespread
concern over the improper disposal of hazardous wastes, Congress enacted
CERCLA, a complex piece of legislation designed to force polluters to pay for costs
associated with remedying their pollution.”).
54. See id. § 9607(a) (imposing liability for the cleanup of facilities on four
categories of persons:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who . . . arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities.
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Once a PRP has been identified, the EPA may utilize one of
three enforcement mechanisms to initiate a cleanup at the
contaminated site: (1) under Section 104, the EPA may undertake
emergency remediation measures in order to clean up a hazardous
site and then sue responsible parties for reimbursement for the
cleanup costs;55 (2) under Section 106, the EPA may issue a judicial
or administrative order compelling one or more potentially
responsible parties to perform a cleanup of the contaminated site;56
or (3) the EPA may enter into a voluntary settlement agreement
with a responsible party to remediate the site.57
If the EPA remediates a contaminated site without first
identifying a responsible party, the agency may bring a Section
107(a) recovery action against PRPs to reimburse their response
costs.58 If PRPs either cannot be located or are insolvent,
Superfund monies will be allocated to fund the remediation of the
site.59 Despite Congressional appropriations, Superfund monies
are limited, so it is crucial for the EPA to locate and establish that
that a PRP is liable to avoid depleting the Superfund.60 As one
attorney stated, “[h]aving money immediately available from a
responsible party would be a game changer.”61
B. Establishing CERCLA Liability

55. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2012).
56. See id. § 9606 (providing the statutory authority for abatement actions).
57. See id. § 9606(a) (stating that the when the President determines that
there may be “imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or
welfare or the environment,” the President may secure relief “as may be necessary
to abate such danger or threat”).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (listing the financial responsibilities of a PRP).
59. See CONGRESSIONAL CERCLA SUMMARY, supra note 49, at 2 (“In the
event that the potentially responsible parties cannot pay or cannot be found,
appropriated Superfund monies may be used to pay the orphan shares of cleanup
costs at a site, under a cost-sharing agreement with the state in which the site is
located.”).
60. See id. at 23–25 (describing the enforcement mechanisms available to
the EPA under CERCLA).
61.See Brown, supra note 16 (discussing who should pay for the cleanup of
contaminated sites).
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CERCLA liability is triggered against a PRP if it is established
that there was a “release” or “threatened release”62 of a “hazardous
substance”63 from a “facility”64 into the environment that will
result in response costs in cleaning the contamination.65 An
identified PRP may be liable for government cleanup costs,
damages to natural resources, the cost of certain health
assessments, and injunctive relief (i.e. performing a cleanup).66
When Congress enacted CERCLA, they expected the liability
for contamination to be sweeping, forcing any party potentially
responsible for the hazardous waste contamination at a site “to
contribute to the costs of the cleanup.”67 With this goal in mind,
CERCLA imposes strict68 joint and several69 liability on any party
found liable.70 While a defendant may evade liability in a limited
number of circumstances,71 courts tend to construe PRP liability
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2018) (defining “release” as broadly including
“any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging,
injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment”).
63. See id. § 9601(14) (defining “hazardous substance” widely to include “any
hazardous waste listed under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, or RCRA; any
imminently dangerous substance under the Toxic Substance Control Act; and any
element, compound, or mixture that may present a substantial danger to the
public health or welfare of the environment”).
64. See id. § 9601(9) (defining a facility to include “any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or
otherwise come to be located”).
65. See id. § 9607 (laying the framework for the liability scheme under
CERCLA).
66. See id. § 9607(a)(4) (providing that PRPs will be liable for all costs of
removal or remedial action as well as any other necessary costs of a response).
67. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 56 n.1 (1998).
68. CONGRESSIONAL CERCLA SUMMARY, supra note 49, at 14 (“Strict liability
means that a party can be held liable regardless of whether the conduct of that
party was negligent.”).
69. See id. (“Joint and several liability means that one or more of the liable
parties can be held responsible for the full cost of the cleanup at a site, regardless
of the degree of involvement in the contamination.”).
70. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CERCLA LIABILITY AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT ACQUISITIONS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES 2 (2011) (“CERCLA is a strict
liability statute that holds potentially responsible parties (PRPs) jointly and
severally liable, without regard to fault, for cleanup costs incurred in response to
the release.”).
71. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(b)(1)–(3) (2012) (detailing the circumstances in
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liberally in order to accomplish the statute’s goal of environmental
cleanup and protection.72
In light of this expansive liability, a PRP may be responsible
for funding the entirety of a cleanup, regardless of its degree of
participation in the contamination.73 Typically, the EPA will focus
on a limited number of PRPs to pay for the cleanup at a
contaminated site, which can cause one PRP to incur an enormous
amount of monetary liability.74 A PRP identified and found liable
under CERCLA may attempt to apportion their costs in an action
against other PRPs.75 Under § 113(f)(1) of CERCLA, a liable party
may seek contribution from other PRPs for their costs incurred as
a result of their cleanup.76 Contribution actions permit a liable
party to recover from a defendant an equitable share of that
defendant’s response costs.77 The huge increase in the cost of
environmental cleanups since the enactment of CERCLA has made
the allocation of response costs for liable parties particularly
important.78
which liability will not attach to a potentially responsible party).
72. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“Because it is a remedial statute, CERCLA must be construed liberally to
effectuate its two primary goals: (1) enabling the EPA to respond efficiently and
expeditiously to toxic spills, and (2) holding those parties responsible for the
releases liable for the costs of the cleanup.”).
73. See Owen T. Smith, The Expansive Scope of Liable Parties Under
CERCLA, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 821, 822–23 (2012) (analyzing the expansive scope
of PRPs under CERCLA).
74. See Jason E. Panzer, Apportioning CERCLA Liability: Cost Recovery or
Contribution, Where Does a PRP Stand?, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 437, 451
Due to financial constraints and other impracticalities, the EPA only
focuses on a few financially viable PRPs to should the entire cost of the
EPA’s remediation or removal measures under § 107(a). The PRPs
singled out by the EPA must then attempt to recover from the PRPs
that the EPA failed to identify.
75. See id. at 442–43 (describing how after a party has been targeted by the
government to clean up a contaminated site, the party “then faces the precarious
task of attempting to apportion their costs among other liable parties”).
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2012) (“Any person may seek contribution
from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 107(a),
during or following any civil action under section 106 [42 USCS § 9606] or under
section 107(a).”).
77. See id. (“In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate.”).
78. See Thomas C. Roberts, Allocation of Liability Under CERCLA: A Carrot
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C. Ownership Liability Under CERCLA

While Congress’s goals in enacting CERCLA were clear,
CERCLA’s statutory language is less so—often lacking clarity or
precision.79 Because of the statute’s ambiguous language,
CERCLA has generated a number of controversies within the
federal court system.80 One such issue that has arisen is whether
courts should extend liability to past and present owners of
contaminated real property—both of whom are PRPs under
CERLCA.81
Applying strict liability to an owner may seem a relatively
straightforward task, but in practice courts have struggled to
determine ownership liability. CERCLA provides little guidance
on the interpretation of the word “owner,” defining an “owner”
circularly as “any person owning” a facility.82 As the Ninth Circuit
noted, this definition “is a bit like defining ‘green’ as ‘green.’”83 This
lack of clarity has led courts to adopt a variety of legal tests to
determine the legal meaning of the term.84

and Stick Formula, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 601, 604 (1987) (estimating that “the total
bill for cleaning up all the hazardous waste disposal sites that eventually may
require cleanup [has] ranged from $8 billion to $100 billion”).
79. See Richard J. Angell & Jeffrey C. Corey, Possession is (Only)
Nine-Tenths of the Law Under CERCLA: Taking Your Claim and Asserting it Too
After Chevron Mining Inc. v. United States, 64 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 26-1,
26-6 (2018) (describing the ambiguity in CERCLA ownership liability before the
decision in Chevron Mining).
80. See Chang, supra note 42, at 1007 (“From the time Congress passed
[CERCLA] in 1980, it has been plagued by many problems and controversies.”).
81. See Angell, supra note 79, at 26-6 (discussing the ambiguity of the
statutory language in CERLCA).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (2012) (“The term ‘owner or operator’
means . . . in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person
owning or operating such facility.”).
83. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Goodwin, 32 F.3d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir.
1994).
84. See Catherine Nampewo, CERCLA: Determining Ownership Liability for
Possessory Interests in Real Property, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L.R. 82, 85 (2012)
(detailing three approaches the used to determine whether an owner is subject to
CERCLA liability).

THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND

1027

1. Tests Addressing Ownership Liability Under CERCLA
In particular, courts have struggled with the question of
ownership liability when a party holds a possessory interest in a
piece of contaminated property that is less than holding title.85 In
this scenario, one PRP holds legal title to contaminated property86
while another PRP, such as a leaseholder, holds an indicia of
ownership to the piece of property.87
Courts have developed various methods for determining
whether a party is an owner for purpose of CERCLA liability. The
first approach, applied in United States v. South Carolina
Recycling and Disposal, Inc.,88 is the “site control” test.89 This
method examines the extent of control and responsibility the
defendant maintained over the contaminated property to
determine CERCLA ownership liability.90 In South Carolina
Recycling, the district court held the lessee liable as an owner and
operator based on the “control over and responsibility” it
maintained over the property during the period of time in which
the contamination occurred.91
The second approach, adopted by the Second Circuit, is
referred to as the “de facto ownership” test.92 In applying this
85. See Morrow, supra note 52, at 339–50 (detailing the three main tests
court have applied when less than full title).
86. See KELLY TROY, LEGAL TITLE VS. EQUITABLE TITLE 2 (2011),
https://www.proeducate.com/courses/Finance/EquitableTitle.pdf
Indicia of ownership means evidence of a secured interest, evidence of
an interest in a security interest, or evidence of an interest in real or
personal property securing a loan or other obligation, including any
legal or equitable title or deed to real or personal property acquired
through or incident to foreclosure.
87. See 40 C.F.R. § 280.200 (2017) (“Indicia of ownership means . . . evidence
of an interest in real or personal property securing a loan or other obligation,
including any legal or equitable title or deed to real or personal property acquired
through or incident to foreclosure.”).
88. 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1986), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub. nom.,
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
89. See id. at 1003 (reasoning that attaching ownership liability to parties
who controlled the site would further Congress’ intent when enacting CERCLA).
90. See id. (noting that “site control is an important consideration in
determining who qualifies as an ‘owner’ under Section 107(a)”).
91. Id. at 1006.
92. See Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equipment Corp., 215 F.3d 321, 330
(2d Cir. 2000) (“Certain lessees may have the requisite indicia of ownership
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method, the Second Circuit rejected the site control approach,
observing the differences between owner and operator liability.93
Instead, the court articulated a five-factor analysis to determine
ownership liability, evaluating whether the PRP had the necessary
indicia of ownership to amount to ownership liability.94 Ultimately
the Second Circuit concluded that the lessee was not an owner
because they “did not possess sufficient attributes of ownership.”95

Finally, the Ninth Circuit applied a third approach to
determine ownership liability, looking to the common law
definition of owner in state where the property is located.96
By applying California’s common law, the court
distinguished between fee title holders and those holding
lesser rights, ultimately finding the lessor to not be an owner
under CERCLA.97
The site control, de facto owner, and common law approaches
demonstrate federal courts’ difficulty in defining and determining
ownership liability.98 While these tests arose to alleviate
vis-a-vis the record owner to be de facto owners and therefore strictly liable.”).
93. See id. at 328 (“Even a cursory examination of the basis for operator
liability reveals that it would be almost entirely subsumed by owner liability that
relied on site control analysis.”).
94. See id. at 330–31 (adopting a non-exclusive five factor test that denotes
whether the defendant had ownership liability. The five factors include:
[(1)] whether the lease is for an extensive term and admits of no rights
in the owner/ lessor to determine how the property is used; (2) whether
the lease cannot be terminated by the owner before it expires by its
terms (3) whether the lessee has the right to sublet all or some of the
property without notifying the owner; (4) whether the lessee is
responsible for payment of all taxes, assessments, insurance, and
operation and maintenance costs; and (5) whether the lessee is
responsible for making all structural and other repairs.
95. Id. at 331.
96. See City of Los Angeles v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 440, 449 (9th
Cir. 2011) (applying the California common law definition of an owner to
determine liability).
97. See id. at 449 (“[T]he holder of a permit for specific use of real property
is not the ‘owner’ of that real property, where, as here, the fee title owner retained
power to control the permittee’s use of the real property.”).
98. See Morrow, supra note 52, at 337 (“Federal courts have struggled to
apply a consistent test to determine if a PRP is an ‘owner’ under CERCLA,
particularly when a PRP possesses an interest in the contaminated property that
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ownership issues when a party owns less than fee title, they have
translated into confusion and overgeneralizations on the path to
determining CERCLA ownership liability.99 This confusion and
ambiguity in the statutory framework has created an avenue for
PRPs to persuasively argue their way out of ownership liability. A
prime example of this is the federal government, which has
attempted to, often successfully, evade CERCLA liability despite
holding legal title to contaminated property.100
2. Federal Government Liability as the Owner of Public Lands
It is not uncommon that courts, when seeking to determine
and apportion CERCLA liability in a contribution action, must
resolve the issue of federal government liability as a PRP.101 The
federal government holds fee title to the nation’s public lands but
has throughout our nation’s history allowed third parties to utilize
or develop the land, resulting in contamination.102 When the
developing parties are identified and found liable as a PRP based
on the contamination on public lands, they are often strapped with
massive liability and, in turn, bring a contribution action against
the federal government as the owner of the contaminated public
lands.103
At the outset, it is important to note that generally the United
States, due to sovereign immunity, cannot be the subject of a
is less than full title.”).
99. See United States v. P.R. Indus. Dev. Co., No. 15-2328, 2017 WL
6061011, at *6 (D.P.R. Dec. 7, 2017)
PRIDCO admits that it is the “titular owner” of the property, but
denies that it is an “owner” within the meaning of CERCLA. According
to PRIDCO, the United States failed to establish that PRDICO
participated in the management of the property. This failure, PRIDCO
asserts, negates its status as an owner.
100. Id.
101. See Steven G. Davidson, Government Liability Under CERCLA, 23 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 47, 47 (1997) (examining governmental liability under
CERCLA).
102. See Chevron Mining v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1265–67
(D.N.M. 2015) (detailing the history of ownership of relevant contaminated lands
subject to the unpatented mining claims).
103. See id. at 1267–68 (providing the procedural history of the contribution
action).
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lawsuit.104 However, in 1986 Congress enacted the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA),105 which expressly
waived the United States’ general sovereign immunity under
CERCLA.106 The Third Circuit further clarified that the federal
government could be held liable under CERCLA in both its
capacity as a federal agent and its role as the owner and operator
of federal facilities.107
After the SARA amendments to CERCLA came a first wave of
CERCLA litigation against the federal government premised on
the government’s ownership of federal facilities, many of which
had released hazardous waste into the surrounding
environment.108 Today, it is well settled that the federal
government is likely to be held liable as an owner and operator of
federal facilities.109 CERCLA lawsuits against the federal
104. See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty,
Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 569–70
(2003) (“[S]overeign immunity functions in a wide range of areas as a ‘clear
statement’ rule for interpretation of statutes claimed to subject the United states
to monetary liabilities, such that, . . . [they] will not apply in the absence of
unusually clear statement.”).
105. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99–499, 100 Stat. 1613.
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (2012) (detailing the application of CERCLA
liability to the federal government); See also id. § 9620
Each
department,
agency,
and
instrumentality
of
the
United States (including the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this
chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally
and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity.
107. See FMC Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994)
(en banc) (“Section 120(a)(1) of CERCLA does not state that regulatory activities
cannot form the basis of liability. Rather it states that the [federal] government
is liable in the same manner and to the same extent as any non-governmental
entity.”).
108. See id. at 42 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (“Studies suggest that there are
numerous [federal] government facilities dangerous enough to fall within the
ambit of CERCLA.”)
109. See Van S. Katzman, The Waste of War: Government CERCLA Liability
at World War II Facilities, 79 VA. L. REV. 1191, 1218–19 (1993) (detailing how “the
federal government itself has willingly acknowledged [ownership liability] in both
FMC Corp. and other cases” because “the United States actually purchased and
held title to a number of production facilities throughout the country during
World War II”).
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government involving contaminated federal facilities tend to be
straightforward, sometimes even with the government accepting
liability, because the federal government not only owns fee title to
the facility but also directly controls it.110 The federal agency with
administrative jurisdiction over the federal facility is responsible
for performing and paying for remediation of the site out of its own
budget.”111
Beyond the government’s CERCLA liability at federal
facilities, governmental liability under CERCLA presents issues
with less apparent resolutions.112 Courts evaluating contribution
actions against the United States must grapple with the question
of whether the federal government should incur CERCLA liability
based upon its status as a titleholder when, often times, the United
States was not the entity that actually polluted the contaminated
land. In other words, should CERCLA liability extend to the
federal government for cleanup costs on public lands that, the
government argues, were not involved in pollution?113
To date, this question arises most frequently in the context of
abandoned mining sites containing hazardous wastes114 The

110. See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 845 (“[W]hen we consider ‘the totality of the
circumstances presented’ we cannot reject the district court's ‘inherently factintensive’ conclusion that the government was an operator of the facility.”)
(quoting Landsford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp. 4 F.3d 1209, 1222
(3d Cir. 1993)).
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(e) (prohibiting the use of Superfund money to clean
up federal facilities because the Superfund Trust monies must be dedicated to
sites where PRPs cannot be identified).
112. See United States v. Friedland, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1243 (D. Colo.
2001) (“[N]o court has specifically addressed whether the United States, as bare
legal title holder of unpatented mining claims, can be held liable as an ‘owner’
under CERCLA where the ‘possessor’ of the land contaminates it.”).
113. See Theodore Garrett, The Governments “Bare Legal Title” Defense Wears
C.
OF
ENVTL.
LAW.
(Aug.
29,
2017),
Thin,
AM.
http://www.acoel.org/post/2017/08/29/The-Government%E2%80%99s%E2%80%9CBare-Legal-Title%E2%80%9D-CERCLA-Defense-Wears-Thin.aspx
(last visited Jan. 7, 2018) (discussing recent case law decisions that support
government contribution to remediation of CERCLA sites on federal lands) (on
file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
114. See John F. Seymour, Hard Rock Mining and the Environment: Issues of
Federal Enforcement and Liability, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 865 (2004) (describing
private entity’s arguments when attempting to win a contribution action against
the United States).
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General Mining Law of 1872115 allows parties to discover, explore,
and reclaim mineral deposits on federally owned lands through
patented and unpatented mining claims.116 In a patented mining
claim, the owner holds title to the land and the mineral rights
underneath it.117 In contrast, in an unpatented mining claim, the
owner holds exclusive subsurface and surface possessory rights to
extract and sell minerals while title to the underlying fee simple
estate in the land remains with the United States.118 Pursuant to
the General Mining Law, the federal government now holds fee
title to contaminated federal lands subject to unpatented mining
claims developed by private individuals and companies.
Courts traditionally hold that unpatented mining claims are
“fully recognized possessory interests” that allow a claimant to sell
and transfer their rights as they so choose.119 The holder of an
unpatented mining claim has superior rights as against third
parties but not as against the United States.120

115. See generally 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2018).
116. See id. (“[A]ll valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United
States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, shall be free and open to exploration and
purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by
citizens of the United States.”).
117. See JAMES J. BUCHWALTER ET. AL, 58 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM MINES &
MINERALS § 142 ( 2019) (explaining the rights conferred by mineral patents).
118. See United States v. Friedland, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1244 (D. Colo.
2001) (describing the history of the development of mineral deposits and
unpatented mining claims).
119. See Ohio Shale Corp. v. Morton, 370 F. Supp. 108, 124 (D. Colo. 1973)
A mining claim is an interest in land which cannot be unreasonably or
unfairly dissolved at the whim of the Interior Department. Once there
is a valid discovery and proper location, a mining claim, in the
language of the Supreme Court, is ‘real property in the highest sense.’
Legal title to the land remains in the United States, but the claimant
enjoys a valid, equitable, possessory title.
Unpatented mining claims can be distinguished from patented mining claims,
which allow private owners to obtain a “patent” from the federal government that
grants fee simple title to the claimant. See Friedland, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 1244
(comparing patented and unpatented mining claims under the General Mining
Law).
120. See id. (detailing the rights of the federal government and the holder of
an unpatented mining claim).
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Decades of hardrock mining have left hazardous wastes on
thousands of abandoned mining sites on federal lands, posing
potential threats to human health and the environment.121 When
the EPA seeks to remediate contaminated mining lands subject to
unpatented mining lands, they will often identify a private mining
company as the PRP.122 In turn, the mining company will bring a
contribution action against the United States as a PRP based on
its holding title to the lands subject to unpatented mining
claims.123 The United States argues that the federal government
does not possess sufficient ownership interests to rise to the level
of “owner” within the meaning of CERCLA.124 This argument has
been coined the “bare legal title” defense.
III. The Rise and Fall of the Bare Legal Title Defense
The term bare legal title refers to the idea that an entity does
not have an equitable ownership in the piece of property, but only
holds legal title to the piece of property.125 The federal government
121. See
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ABANDONED MINE SITE
CHARACTERIZATION
AND
CLEANUP
HANDBOOK
30–40
(2000),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201509/documents/2000_08_pdfs_amscch.pdf (introducing the types of impact mining
and mineral operations have had on federal, state, tribal, and private lands).
122. See Friedland, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 1237 (describing the defendant’s
contribution action against the United States).
123. Id.
124. For example, in United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the EPA brought
an action against mining companies to recover costs incurred to clean up sites
contaminated by more than a century of mining. See United States v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. CV-89-39-BU-PG, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21708, at *6 (D. Mont.
Nov. 1, 1994). The defendant counterclaimed against the United States as an
“owner” at the time of disposal because the BLM held title to the lands that were
subject to the unpatented mining claims. Id. at *5–6. The United States
magistrate found that “[g]iven the historical context within which the government
operated and the nature and extent of the title held by the government, . . . the
United States was not an ‘owner’ for purposes of CERCLA liability.” Id. at *17.
125. See Julie E. Hough, “Bare Legal Title”—Or Property of the Bankruptcy
Estate?, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 18 (2012) (describing the origins of the bare legal
title defense). The term “bare legal title” is used in bankruptcy law to describe a
situation in which a debtor holds title to a piece of land, but a court finds that the
property is not actually the property of the debtor and should not be considered
part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. Id. Normally, the court will find that the
debtor only held bare legal title to the land based upon factors such as lack of
property taxes paid by the debtor or lack of maintenance and upkeep provided by
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argues that while it holds legal title to the unpatented mining
claims, it should not be held liable under CERCLA because it does
not hold any equitable interest in the piece of property—the
claimant to the unpatented mining claim holds the ability to use
and control the land.126
The bare legal title defense has provided a means for the
federal government to evade CERCLA liability despite its
ownership interest in contaminated public lands. Some courts
have accepted the rationale underlying the federal government’s
argument, while others have rejected it and equated legal title
ownership to CERCLA ownership liability. The lack of clear
definition of “owner” under CERCLA coupled with federal courts’
inability to consistently apply a test for ownership less than fee
title has persuaded some courts to accept the federal government’s
reasons. Thus, the issue remains whether the courts should accept
the government’s attempt at evading CERCLA ownership liability
through the bare legal title defense.
A. The Federal Government Successfully Evades Liability
The term “bare legal title” comes from tax and bankruptcy law,
where it helped determine whether a debtor holds an equitable
ownership interest in a piece of property.127 The federal
government took “bare legal title” out of its bankruptcy context to
argue that while it holds legal title to the unpatented mining
claims, it should not be held liable under CERCLA because it does
not hold any equitable interest in the piece of property—the
claimant to the unpatented mining claim has the ability to use and
control the land.128
the debtor. In these situations, the court will hold that the “property ostensibly
belonging to the debtor will actually not be property of the debtor, but will be held
in trust for another.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012).
126. See Friedland, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (laying out the government’s
argument that bare legal title is insufficient for purposes of CERCLA “owner”
liability).
127. See Hough, supra note 125, and accompanying text.
128. See Friedland, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (laying out the government’s
argument that bare legal title is insufficient for purposes of CERCLA “owner”
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In United States v. Friedland,129 the federal government for
the first time used the “bare legal title” beyond its traditional
use.130 In Friedland, the court addressed the federal government’s
CERCLA ownership liability in a contribution action based solely
on its ownership of unpatented mining claims.131 The plaintiff,
Industrial Constructors Corporation (ICC), alleged that the United
States’ ownership interest at the Summitville Mine site qualified
it as an “owner” and thus a PRP liable for contribution under
CERCLA.132 Neither ICC nor the United States contested the fact
that the United States was the record owner at the Summitville
Mine site.133 However, it was the plaintiff’s, and not the federal
government’s, conduct that resulted in the contamination at the
site.134 Thus, the question the court addressed was whether legal
title, here to unpatented mining claims, could be enough to create
ownership liability under CERCLA.135 The federal government
argued that bare legal title to unpatented mining claims was
insufficient for purposes of CERCLA ownership liability.136
The district court recognized that the statutory language of
CERCLA offered no guidance to interpret ownership liability.137
The court attempted to discern a natural meaning of the term
“owner,” concluding that no natural meaning of the word would
resolve the conflict at issue.138 In light of this, the court pointed to
liability).
129. 152 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Colo. 2001).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 1237 (discussing the plaintiff’s claim against the United States
based upon its record title ownership at the contaminated site).
132. Id.
133. See id. at 1241 (“There is no dispute that the United States, as holder of
bare legal title to a number of unpatented mining claims randomly located within
the boundaries of the Summitville Mine site, is a ‘record owner’ of certain real
property or mineral interest at the Summitville Mine.”).
134. Id. at 1242.
135. See id. at 1241 (detailing the United States’ concessions).
136. See id. (providing the United States’ arguments against liability).
137. See id. at 1242 (“The phrase ‘owner’—tautologically defined by Congress
as ‘any person . . . owning’ a facility—is a paradigm of neither clarity nor precision,
much less a model of legislative draftsmanship.”).
138. See id.
According to Webster’s dictionary, an owner is “one that has the legal
or rightful title whether the possessor or not.” Black's Law Dictionary,
however, equivocates between titular and possessory ownership,
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other decisions that addressed the scope of ownership liability
under CERCLA in alternate contexts.139 The court found the “site
control” test persuasive,140 noting that site control provides
sufficient indicia of ownership to impose CERCLA liability on a
party.141 Applying this test, the court examined the unique nature
of the United States’ interest in an unpatented mining claim to
determine if there were sufficient indicia of ownership to merit the
application of ownership liability.142
The United States argued that its property interest in the
unpatented mining claims at issue stood “in stark contrast to most
‘owners’ of property.”143 Specifically, the United States “(1) [had]
defining an owner variously as “one who has the right to possess, use,
and convey something,” and as “one who has the primary or residuary
title to property.”
139. See id. (“In various third-party contexts, however—such as where the
alleged ‘owner’ acted in the capacity of either trustee or conservator/executor of
the property in question—several courts have addressed the scope of ‘owner’
liability under CERCLA and whether bare legal title alone is sufficient to trigger
such liability.”). The court looked to several cases when coming to their
conclusion. In Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 871 F. Supp. 360,
366– 67 (N.D. Cal. 1994), the court held that ownership liability under CERCLA
could extend to both conservators and executors of land if it was found they hold
an “indicia of ownership” beyond bare legal title during the period of hazardous
waste disposal. In City of Phoenix v. Garbage Services Co., 827 F. Supp. 600, 607
(D. Ariz. 1993), the court held a bank liable in its capacity as a trustee for
responses costs incurred in the cleaning up of the contaminated property even
though it only held bare legal title. In Friedland, both Castlerock Estates and City
of Phoenix were dispositive in determining that more than “bare legal title” was
necessary to find liability. United States v. Friedland, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1243
(D. Colo. 2001).
140. See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text (detailing the site control
test).
141. See Friedland, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 (finding the site control test to be
dispositive in a determination of ownership liability).
142. See id. at 1245–45 (looking to Supreme Court cases that describe the
interests held by the United States and the owner of an unpatented mining
claim). In Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 260 U.S. 306, 316–17 (1930),
the court described the interest held by the owner off an unpatented mining claim:
When the location of a mining claim is perfected under the law, it has
the effect of a grant by the United States of the rights of present and
exclusive possession. The claim is property in the fullest sense of that
term; and may be sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited without
infringing any right or title of the United States.
143. Friedland, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 1245.
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no notice of initiation of the possession of its property, (2) [had] no
ability to exclude persons from entering upon its lands that are
open to mining claims, . . . (3) [had] no contractual relationship
with the possessor of the property,” (4) received no financial benefit
from the lands subject to unpatented mining claims and (5) lacked
the power to retain title to the land if the claimant chose to seek
title.144 Based on these differences, the United States argued they
should not be an owner for purposes of CERCLA liability.
The court compared the roles of the federal government and
the unpatented mining holder in the development of the lands
subject to unpatented mining claims, finding that “the United
States [was] not an ‘owner’ in the fullest sense of the term.”145
While the United States retained title in the land and broad
powers over the terms upon which the land could be used, leased,
and acquired, the United States received no financial benefit from
its lands subject to unpatented mining claims and lacked the
power to retain title to its land if the claimant seeks title.146 In
addition, the United States had no ability to set the boundaries of
the conveyance or establish the terms of the sale based upon the
land’s value.147 Finally, the United States is not allowed to exclude
individuals from the land and may only regulate mining activities
in the national forests in order to protect surface resources.148
Friedland distinguished between two potential owners for
CERCLA purposes: the “owner” that holds fee title to the
contaminated property and the “owner” that holds a claim to the
land but does not have the ability to possess and control the land.149
Ultimately, the court held that the United States could not be
deemed an “owner” for purposes of CERCLA liability based upon
the limited nature of the ownership rights it holds in unpatented
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1246.
146. See id. (providing the United States’ arguments against liability).
147. See id. (discussing the United States’ interest in the mining lands).
148. See id. at 1246 (“[T]he United States argues that, throughout the history
of mining at Summitville, the United States’ property interest at the site was
encumbered by privately owned mining claims covering the land subject to mining
activity.”).
149. See id. at 1246 (finding that the United States is not an owner under
CERCLA because of its limited role compared to the holder of the unpatented
mining claim).
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mining claims.150 The court described the United States’ interest
in the land as “bare legal title”151—establishing what has now
become known as the federal government’s “bare legal title”
defense.152
B. Two Courts Reject the Bare Legal Title Defense

Following the federal government’s successful argument
in Friedland, they have attempted to use the “bare legal title”
defense to avoid CERCLA ownership liability in other
contribution actions involving unpatented mining claims.
However, in recent decisions, courts have rejected the bare
legal title defense and instead held the federal government
liable for the cleanup costs associated with historic mining
operations.153 These cases, discussed in depth below, may
represent a growing trend of expanding liability to the
federal government for its role as an owner of contaminated
public lands.154

150. Id. at 1246.
151. Id. at 1242.
152. See Garrett, supra note 113 (“Two recent decision reject the government’s
argument that its ‘bare legal title’ should not give rise to CERCLA owner
liability.”).
153. See Chevron Mining v. United States, 863 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir.
2017) (holding the United States liable under CERCLA as an owner of portions of
mining sites during the time hazardous substances came to located there); El Paso
Natural Gas v. United States, No. CV-14-08165-PCT-DGC, 2017 WL 3492993, at
*2 (Dist. Ariz. Aug. 15, 2017) (same).
154. See CERCLA Liability of U.S. Government as Owner, Operator, or
Arranger for Clean-Up Cost and NRD on Public Lands, STAFFORD (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.straffordpub.com/products/cercla-liability-of-u-s-government-asowner-operator-or-arranger-for-clean-up-cost-and-nrd-on-public-lands-2017-1121 (last visited on Nov. 27, 2017) (showing that one commentator has
affirmatively stated that, “[t]hese decisions represent a growing trend of
courts holding the federal government liable in its various roles as
landlord”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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1. Chevron Mining v. United States Rejects the Bare Legal
Title Argument
In the first case, Chevron Mining v. United States,155 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the holder of fee title—in this
case, the United States—is liable as an owner regardless of the role
it played in the creation or disposal of hazardous waste.156 In
Chevron Mining, Chevron Mining Incorporated (CMI) and its
corporate predecessors filed suit against the United States seeking
to hold the federal government strictly liable for its equitable share
of cleanup costs as an “owner” and “arranger” at the contaminated
site in question.157 The United States held fee title to national
forest land subject to unpatented mining claims on a portion of the
mining site near Questa, New Mexico, referred to by the parties as
the “Questa Site.”158 From 1919 to 2014, CMI and its corporate
predecessors mined molybdenum at the Questa Site, generating
significant amounts of hazardous substances.159 In 1957, the
Defense Minerals Exploration Administration (DMEA) entered
into an exploration project contract with CMI, driven by the United
States’ domestic molybdenum production goal.160 Under the
contract, CMI was responsible for the exploration, drilling, and
sampling of minerals at the site.161 In return, the United States
loaned CMI funds for half of the expenditures of its work.162 All of
the exploration work under the contract required government
approval.163 CMI also conducted exploration outside of the DMEA
contract, ultimately spending over $4,000,000 of their own funds
to mine the lands by 1964.164 The DMEA Exploration Contract
ended in 1960, and CMI made its final royalty payment to the
United States in 1966.165
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

139 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1263 (D.N.M. 2015).
See id. at 1277 (holding the United States liable as a PRP).
See id. at 1266 (discussing the procedural background of the lawsuit).
See id. at 1267 (discussing the background of the contaminated site).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The mining at the Questa Site generated an extensive amount
of hazardous waste, resulting in a costly cleanup.166 The hazardous
waste generated from the mining was not a surprise to either
party.167 CMI acknowledged its status as a PRP and began
remediation measures pursuant to EPA orders. CMI filed suit for
financial contribution against the United States as an “owner” and
“arranger” for its equitable share of past, present, and future
remediation costs.168
The District Court of New Mexico, in reviewing CMI’s
contribution action, held that the federal government’s ownership
interest at the Questa site was insufficient to establish ownership
liability.169 The district court agreed with the Friedland court’s
focus on the indicia of ownership analysis.170 The court was not
persuaded by CMI’s argument that legal title should conclusively
establish ownership liability under CERCLA.171 Instead, the court
applied an indicia of ownership test, finding it dispositive that CMI
maintained the right to use and control the property.172
166. See id. at 1268 (“Approximately 150 thousand tons of waste rock were
generated from the early underground mining operations, 328 million tons of
waste rock and 75 million tons of ‘tailings’ from the open-pit mining, and 25
million tons of tailings from the renewed underground mining.”).
167. See id.
The substantial amount of waste generated by these mining activities
was not unexpected. When Molycorp first discovered the molybdenum
ore deposit in 1960, for example, government engineers produced a
“Final Geological and Engineering Report” estimating over 99% of the
material extracted from the 260-million-ton ore deposit would need to
be discarded as waste. Nonetheless, the federal government actively
encouraged—and, indeed, funded—Molycorp’s mining activities at this
site.
168. Id. at 1263.
169. See id. (“Having considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, the
relevant case law, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, the Court
grants the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment and denies Plaintiff’s
Motions for Summary Judgment.”).
170. Id. at 1271 (agreeing with “Friedland’s focus on who owns which strands
of the bundle of property rights in determining whether the United States is an
owner”).
171. Id.
172. See id. at 1274 (“Given that the United States’ ownership interests in
land on which another holds unpatented mining claims are unique, there is no
comparable ownership interests of private parties in other contexts.”).

THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND

1041

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision, holding the United States liable as an “owner” but not as
an “arranger” under CERCLA.173 The federal government argued
that it did not have the required “indicia of ownership” to be
considered an owner under Section 107(a) because it did not
control the mining activity.174 The federal government referenced
the General Mining Act of 1872 to argue that the limited nature of
its rights as fee title holders enabled CMI, as holder of the
unpatented mining claims, to have the exclusive right of
possession of the surface land.175 The Court of Appeals rejected this
argument, holding the federal government liable as an owner
regardless of whether CMI maintained the exclusive use and
possession of the lands without any control by the United States.
In rejecting the government’s argument, the Tenth Circuit
stated that “owner” covers fee title holders, regardless of any
additional indicia of ownership.176 The court rejected Friedland’s
requirement that ownership liability required a threshold level of
ownership beyond their rights as titleholder.177 The court
considered the ordinary meaning of the word “owner” as well as
the statutory construction of CERCLA to find a distinction
between federally owned and federally controlled properties.178
The court then remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings to determine the United States’ equitable share of
past, present, and future cleanup costs at the Questa Site.179

173. See Chevron Mining v. United States, 863 F.3d 1261, 1262 (10th Cir.
2017) (concluding that the United States is an “owner” and, therefore, a PRP
under CERCLA).
174. Id. at 1273.
175. See id. at 1270 (outlining the major provisions of the General Mining
Act).
176. See id. at 1272 (“Owner liability attaches to ‘any person owning’ the
contaminated facility.”) The court also explained that “the potentially responsible
person inquiry ‘rests on the relationship between’ the defendant and the ‘facility
itself.’” (quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 68 (1998)).
177. See id. at 1275 (“The government urges us to adopt Friedland’s indicia of
ownership test. But we find it neither persuasive in principle nor in application.”).
178. See id. at 1272 (“The ordinary or natural meaning of ‘owner’ includes, at
a minimum, a legal title owner.”).
179. Id. at 1266.
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2. El Paso Natural Gas v. United States Applies Chevron
Mining’s Reasoning
Since Chevron Mining, several other courts have opined on the
bare legal title defense.180 In El Paso Natural Gas v. United
States,181 the District Court for the District of Arizona addressed
the extent of the federal government’s CERCLA liability as an
owner, citing Chevron Mining in support of its finding of
liability.182 The plaintiff, El Paso Natural Gas Company, brought
a contribution action against the United States to recover costs
incurred in remediating a contaminated site on the Navajo
Reservation.183 The federal government argued that it was not an
owner within the meaning of CERCLA because “its ownership
interest [was] limited—it holds reservation land in trust for the
benefit of the Navajo Nation.”184 Both parties stipulated that the
United States owned fee title to the uncontaminated lands that
were held in trust for the Najavos.185 In determining the outcome
of the case, the district court looked at the broad remedial goals of
CERCLA, the ordinary meaning of word “ownership,” the nature
of the United States’ interest in the contaminated property, and

180. See United States v. Puerto Rico Indus. Dev. Co., 287 F. Supp. 3d 133,
143 (D.P.R. 2017) (“Just as the United States argued in Chevron Mining Inc.,
PRIDCO asserts that it is immune from liability pursuant to CERCLA because it
‘merely holds bare title’ to the property. PRIDCO’s argument is unconvincing
because it cites no authority to support the proposition that bare legal title,
without more, is insufficient to trigger liability pursuant to section 107.”).
181. No. CV-14-08165-PCT-DGC, 2017 WL 3492993 (Dist. Ariz. Aug. 15,
2017).
182. Id. at *15–16 (“Finding that CERCLA envisions liability even for those
who did not contribute to contamination, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
CERCLA imposed liability on the United States as the fee title owner of
unpatented mining claims, even if it could be argued that the United States held
only ‘bare legal title.’”).
183. See id. at *1–2 (“Plaintiff . . . brings claims against Defendants United
States of America, the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
the U.S. Geological Survey, the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (collectively, the ‘United States.’”).
184. Id. at *2.
185. See id. at *9 (discussing the United States’ interest in the Reservation
Land).

THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND

1043

the relevant case law on the issue.186 Specifically, the court found
that,
While the United States has granted a significant property
interest to the Navajo Nation—exclusive use and possession of
reservation land, amounting to a compensable interest—the fact
remains that the United States holds fee title and substantial
power over the land, including the power to enter, control
alienation, and take.187
The court held the United States liable based upon CERCLA’s
“simple declaration that facility owners are liable and the court’s
obligation to construe ‘owner’ liberally.”188 The court further found
that the extent of the federal government’s liability should be
determined at the allocation phase of the trial and would be based
on equitable allocation.189 Ultimately, this court also rejected the
federal government’s bare legal title argument.190
IV. The Bare Legal Title Defense is Inconsistent with CERCLA
Whether liability should extend to the federal government as
the fee title holder of federal lands has yet be resolved. Both
Chevron Mining and El Paso Natural Gas denied the government’s
“bare legal title” defense,191 suggesting that CERCLA liability
should extend to the federal government in its capacity as fee
titleholder of unpatented mining claims.192 Because the federal
government holds fee title to contaminated mining claims across
the United States, this issue will again make its way into the court
system as parties seek to clean up hazardous wastes at former
mining cites. Courts will continue to grapple with the question of

186. See id. at *4–13 (providing a framework for its analysis).
187. Id. at *12–13.
188. Id. at *5.
189. See id. at *17 (“The Court’s holding that the United States is an owner,
therefore, does not decide the extent of its liability for contamination at the Mine
Sites.”).
190. Id.
191. See supra Part III.B (discussing the holdings of Chevron Mining and El
Paso Natural Gas).
192. See id. (discussing the holdings of Chevron Mining and El Paso Natural
Gas).
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whether the federal government’s involvement as an owner should
amount to a showing of strict liability.
By extending liability to the federal government for its role as
title holder to public lands, Chevron Mining, and cases applying its
reasoning, came to the correct result. The following Part analyzes
the rationale for extending CERCLA liability to the holder of
unpatented mining claims. For the reasons stated in Chevron
Mining, and for reasons discussed in-depth below, courts should
reject the federal government’s application of the bare legal title
defense.
A. Bare Legal Title Is an Improper Expansion of the Site Control
Test
First, the court should reject the federal government’s bare
legal title argument. By relying on the government’s “indicia of
ownership” to the contaminated land instead of its role as title
holder, the federal government is trying to reduce a category of
PRP, contrary to CERCLA’s expansive goals.
The Friedland court found the site control test persuasive in
determining the federal government’s ownership liability.193
However, the Friedland court, in accepting the government’s bare
legal title argument, overlooked the fact that the site control test
was constructed to resolve the question of ownership liability when
a party does not hold title to contaminated property but has many
of the rights that make it equivalent to an owner—194not in
situations when the party does hold title.
The court in South Carolina Recycling first articulated the site
control test.195 In this case, the court created the site control test
to determine whether Columbia Organic Chemical Company
(COCC) was an owner under CERCLA. The court held that COCC,
193. See supra notes 85–96 and accompanying text (discussing the Friedland
court’s rationale in coming to a conclusion).
194. See supra notes 85–96 and accompanying text (outlining three tests used
by courts to determine liability for interests less than fee title).
195.
See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text (describing the Friedland
site control test).
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a lessee which had subleased a property to those that
contaminated the property, should be held liable as an owner
because it “maintained control over and responsibility for the use
of the property and, essentially, stood in the shoes of the property
owners.”196 COCC did not hold fee title to the piece of property, so
the court created the site control test to expand the category of
ownership liability beyond how it was traditionally construed to
encompass a party that acted as an owner would.197 However,
CCCC was found to be a PRP in addition to and not in lieu of the
title holder owners of the contaminated site.198
The federal government is essentially in the opposite position
as COCC—the government holds fee title to a piece of
contaminated property but claims to not have control over the land
and, thus, claims they should not be considered an owner. The
distinction between the two positions is critical—courts routinely
allocate ownership liability to a party holding legal title to a piece
of contaminated property but not necessarily to a party that uses
the land without holding title.199 In fact, courts routinely impose
liability on the fee title holder of a site for purposes of CERCLA
litigation despite arguments that the owner had no responsibility
over the disposal activity.200 As one court clearly articulated, an
196. Id. at 3003.
197. See id. (“As a general rule, a lessor or sublessor who allows property
under his control to be used by another in a manner which endangers third parties
or which creates a nuisance, is, along with the lessee or sublessee, liable for the
harm.”).
198. See id. at 1003 (“Accordingly, site lessees like COCC should, along with
the property owners themselves, be considered “owners” for purposes of imposing
liability under Section 107(a). To conclude otherwise would frustrate Congress’
intent that persons with responsibility for hazardous conditions bear the cost of
remedying those conditions.”).
199. See William B. Johnson, Annotation, Private Entity’s Status as Owner or
Operator Under § 107(a)(1,2) of Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(a)(1,2)) (CERCLA), 140
A.L.R. Fed. 181, 183 (1997 & 2017 Supp.) (“Where entities have held title to a
contaminated facility, there has been relatively little litigation on the issue
whether they qualified as ‘owners’ for purposes of CERCLA liability. Clearly, the
owner of a manufacturing facility or waste disposal facility is an ‘owner’ for
purposes of CERCLA liability.”).
200. See id. (describing how in the entire course of CERCLA litigation, “when
an entity has held title to a contaminated facility there has been relatively little
litigation on the issue of whether [holders of fee title] qualify as ‘owners’ for
purposes of CERCLA litigation”); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160,
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“owner” is someone “who holds title to the facility.”201 Owning title
to a piece of property by itself, regardless of any control or lack of
control, is sufficient for ownership liability.202 Thus, at a minimum,
one could safely assume that if “owner” means nothing else, it
means a person who holds legal title to a piece of land.203

Rather, the majority of the litigation surrounding
“ownership” liability has arisen in messier ownership
scenarios.204 Courts have struggled to determine whether a
party should be considered an owner when they control the
site but do not hold fee title to it.205 CERCLA’s legislative
history makes clear that “owner” is meant to encompass not
only “those persons who hold title to a . . . facility, but those
who in the absence of holding title, possess some equivalent
evidence of ownership.”206 This situation occurs, for example,
when a lessee or a manager of a site exercises so much control
168 (4th Cir. 1988) ("The plain language of section 107(a)(2) extends liability to
owners of waste facilities regardless of their degree of participation in the
subsequent disposal of hazardous waste.").
201. Coppola v. Smith, 19 F. Supp. 3d 960, 969 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (citing
Redevelopment Agency of City of Stockton v. BNSF, 643 F.3d 668, 679–81 (9th Cir.
2011)).
202. United States v. Honeywell Int’l, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1198 (E.D. Cal.
2008) (quoting Lincoln Prop., Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1533 (E.D. Cal.
1992)) (“[O]wnership of the property on which the release took place is sufficient
to impose liability under § 107(a), regardless of any control or lack of control over
the disposal activities.”).
203. See Johnson, supra note 200, at 183
Clearly, the owner of a manufacturing facility or waste disposal facility
is an ‘owner’ for purposes of CERCLA liability. . . . Courts have held
that titleholders qualified as ‘owners’ for purposes of liability under
§ 107(a) of CERCLA, even though they did not participate in the waste
disposal activities that took place on their property. It has been held
that mere ownership of the property from which the release took place
is sufficient to qualify an entity as an owner.
204. See id. (“Thus, as to title-holders, the litigation has arisen with respect
to peripheral issues.”).
205. See, e.g., United States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc., 788 F.
Supp. 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding the lessee bank that subleased property to
dry cleaner operator to be an "owner" subject to CERCLA liability because the
bank ultimately had responsibility over the site).
206. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, H.R. REP. NO. 172, at 37
(1979).
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over a piece of property that the lessee or manager can be
said to be in a same position as the legal title holder of the
property.207 Based upon this idea, courts have extended
ownership liability to parties beyond mere title owners.208
The circuit split tests discussed in Part III209 arose as a
means to supplement the meaning of term “owner” in the
absence of legal title to the land.210 It is not logical to apply
these tests, which were meant to explain circumstances in
which a party has all of the rights of an owner except for legal
title, to a situation in which an entity actually holds legal
title to a piece of property.211 These tests evolved as a way to
implement a functional definition of the term owner in order
to expand the scope of ownership liability under CERCLA.212
The tests were not meant to enable titleholders to evade
CERCLA ownership liability nor should courts allow the

207. See, e.g., Grand Truck W.R.R. v. Acme Belt Recoating, 859 F. Supp. 1125,
1130 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (demonstrating a situation in which a court has had to
determine whether an entity that did not hold title to land is still liable as an
“owner” under CERCLA). In Grand Truck Western Railroad Co. v. Acme Belt
Recoating, the court held that the owner of an easement providing the holder with
access to the street was not an owner under CERCLA for contamination of the
easement property. Id. The court concluded that while the easement holder held
an interest in the property, the only entity that owned the easement property was
the holder of the fee simple interest in the land. Id. In another situation, the court
had to determine whether a property manager qualified as an “owner” for purpose
of CERCLA liability. Combined Properties/Reseda Assocs. v. Kechichian, 23
E.L.R. 20810, No. CV 91-0272-DWW(JRx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 1992). The court
found the property manager was an owner when he acquired the rights and
responsibilities consistent with ownership. Id.
208. See Johnson, supra note 200, at 184 (detailing CERCLA ownership
liability when an entity did not hold legal title).
209. See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text (describing different tests
circuits have applied in order to determine ownership liability when a party held
less than full title to a piece of property).
210. Id.
211. See El Paso Natural Gas v. United States, No. CV-14-08165-PCT-DGC,
2017 WL 3492993, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 15, 2017) (“The Ninth Circuit cases cited
in the Court’s previous order considered whether a person other than the fee title
holder could be an owner under CERCLA, and looked to common law for the
answer. The question in this case is the reverse—whether a fee title holder can
be deemed a non-owner for purposes of CERCLA.”).
212. See Johnson, supra note 200, at 186 (detailing expansive approaches to
CERCLA ownership liability to easement holders and lessees).
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federal government to do so.213
B. Bare Legal Title is Inconsistent with the Goals of CERCLA

Next, allowing the federal government to prevail in their
application of the bare legal title defense is inconsistent with
the goals Congress envisioned when writing CERCLA. In
their enactment, Congress pursued dual goals: (1) to prevent
environmental contamination; and (2) to clean up hazardous
waste sites.214 Enabling the federal government to
circumvent CERCLA liability for its role as titleholder to
public lands frustrates both goals of the Act. CERCLA
“should not be read in any way that frustrates the statute’s
goals,”215 so courts should not allow the federal government
to evade CERCLA liability.
1. Contrary to CERCLA’s Goal of Timely Cleanup

First, through CERCLA’s enactment Congress sought to
ensure the timely cleanup of hazardous substances on
contaminated lands.216 In order to timely cleanup hazardous
sites, the EPA must have adequate funds to remediate sites
on the NPL.217 While site cleanups have been funded through
the Superfund Trust, Congressional funding of the
213. Id.
214. S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 3 (1980) (discussing Congress’ ambitions when
enacting CERCLA).
215. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985)
(finding that there is no causation requirement within CERCLA statutory
framework).
216. S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 3 (1980) (discussing Congress’ ambitions when
enacting CERCLA) (detailing Congress’ goals when enacting CERCLA).
217. See Bryan Anderson, Taxpayers Dollars Fund the Most Oversight and
Cleanup Costs at Superfund Sites, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/taxpayer-dollars-fund-most-oversightand-cleanup-costs-at-superfund-sites/2017/09/20/aedcd426-8209-11e7-902a2a9f2d808496_story.html?utm_term=.33c71293dbe1 (last visited Mar. 1, 2018)
(detailing funding issues at Superfund sites) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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Superfund has gradually decreased.218 The lack of money in
the Superfund has caused the cleanup process, which is often
costly, to slow, both in the number of sites cleaned and the
time the cleanups take.219 As President Barack Obama noted,
Superfund appropriations are “competing with a multitude of
other activities and obligations of the federal government.”220
PRPs should pay for the remediation of contaminated sites so
that Superfund monies can be applied in circumstances in
which no PRP can be identified.
While it may seem counter-intuitive to hold the federal
government, the entity that funds the Superfund, liable, it is
not. Funding for the Superfund and financing to cleanup sites
when the United States is found to be a PRP come from
separate sources—specifically, when the United States is
found to be a PRP the money comes from the responsible
agency’s budget, not from the Superfund trust.221 While it
would be beneficial to be able to locate and identify a private
corporation as a PRP as well, often PRPs either cannot be
identified or, if they are, they have become insolvent.
Establishing the precedent of holding the federal
government, a party that can always be located and will
never be insolvent, liable as an owner will allow the
Superfund trust monies to be allocated to the remediation of
other hazardous sites.222 In doing so, courts will in turn
promote the timely cleanup of contaminated sites throughout
the United States.
2. Contrary to CERCLA’s Deterrent Goals

Additionally, in enacting CERLCA Congress aspired for
218. See id. (discussing the gradual decline of Superfund appropriations).
219. See id. (articulating the consequences on decreased Superfund
appropriations).
220. Id.
221. See id. at 30 (“However, the [Superfunds] are not explicitly authorized to
pay cleanup cost-recovery or contribution claims . . . where a federal agency may
be held liable as a generator or transporter of wastes sent to a site for disposal.”).
222. See Congressional CERCLA Summary, supra note 49, at 2 (“In the event
that the potentially responsible parties cannot pay or cannot be found,
appropriated Superfund monies may be used to pay the orphan shares of cleanup
costs at a site.”).
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CERCLA to serve preventive ends.223 As Phillip Cummings,
the chief counsel of the Senate Environment Committee at
the time CERCLA was drafted wrote, “[T]he main purpose of
CERCLA is to make spilling or dumping of hazardous wastes
less likely through liability.”224 By imposing strict liability on
a broad class, Congress intended to create powerful
incentives “for waste reduction and care waste
management.”225 Strict liability is meant to “maximize
deterrence and ease enforcement difficulties” by establishing
easy rules for a court to follow.226 It follows then that any
attempt by a court to interpret CERCLA in a way that
empowers a party to elude strict liability is inconsistent with
the preventative goals of the Act.227
Congress intended PRP liability be interpreted
expansively as possible because the more inclusive a group of
PRPs is found to be, the more likely it is parties require
proper hazardous waste protocol. If a broad definition of
owner applies to the federal government, the federal
government will likely insist on a set of rules parties must
abide by when authorizing the use of public lands as a way to
avoid future liability in contribution actions.228
223. See ROBERT K. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW
SCIENCE AND POLICY 395 (6th ed. 2009).
224. Phillip Cummings, Completing the Circle, 7 ENVTL. FORUM 6, 11–12
(1990).
225. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 223, at 396.
226. See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 (2002)
(citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 14 (1991)) (discussing the
strict liability scheme within the Anti-Drug Abuse Act).
227. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985)
(finding that CERCLA should not be interpreted to frustrate its statutory goals).
228. See Thomas Perry & Sarah Wightman, Owner of a Lonely Heart: Federal
Government Labile for CERCLA Damages on Public Lands, MARTEN LAW (Sept.
21, 2017) http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20170921-federal-governmentcercla-damages-public-lands#_edn34 (last visited on Mar. 1, 2018)
[G]iven the federal government’s growing liability profile, it may insist
on more conditions or compensatory mitigation in authorizing the use
of public land to mining companies, as a hedge against future liability
of any cleanup costs. In any event, these decisions have the potential
to shape the relationship between the United States and mining
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In Chevron Mining, the federal government and the
plaintiff argued for two opposing views of ownership liability.
The plaintiff argued that an “owner” should be a “record
owner” while the federal government argued that an “owner”
is someone who holds sufficient “indicia of ownership” to the
land.229 The federal government argued for a narrow
definition of the term “owner” while the defendant argued
that ownership liability should be construed broadly. Thus,
rejecting the federal government’s bare legal title argument,
a narrow interpretation of the Act, would enable CERCLA to
reduce or eliminate future pollution on public lands.230 Thus,
the plaintiff’s expansive interpretation is in line with the
legislative intent of the Act.
3. Contrary to the Congress’ Rejection of a Causation Requirement

Further, in promoting Congress’s deterrent goals, courts
have interpreted CERCLA to cover owners and operators
without regard to causation.231 When Congress enacted the
statute, it specifically rejected including a causation
requirement in section 9607(a) of CERCLA.232 The lack of
causation requirement in the Act means that an ownership
liability does not depend on activity furthering or
contributing to the waste contamination at a contaminated
site.233 Despite this lack of causation requirement in
CERCLA, the federal government’s bare legal title argument
companies in the West.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
229. See Chevron Mining, 863 F.3d at 1276 (questioning the federal
government’s argument that there should be an adoption of the indicia of
ownership test).
230. Id.
231. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that an owner is liable regardless of any contribution to the
contamination at a site).
232. See id. at 1044 (“The early House version imposed liability only upon ‘any
person who caused or contributed to the release or threatened release.’ . . . The
compromise version, to which the House later agreed, . . . imposed liability on
classes of persons without reference to whether they caused or contributed to the
release or threat of release.”).
233. See id. (relating how ownership liability does not require any knowledge
or participation in the contamination).
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essentially asks the court to read into CERCLA a causation
requirement.234 By suggesting that there need to be an
indicia of ownership to be considered an owner, the federal
government is suggesting a test that requires control over the
property or hazardous substances.235 However, as the
legislative history and courts’ interpretation have made
clear, there is no causation requirement and, as such, actual
control is not required for a determination of ownership
liability.236 On the contrary, “the trigger to liability under §
9607(a)(2) is ownership or operation of a facility at the time
of disposal, not culpability or responsibility for the
contamination.”237
4. Congress’s Intention to Hold the Federal Government Liable

In addition to Congress’s ambitions when enacting
CERCLA, Congress specifically intended the federal
government to be held liable under CERCLA in the exact
same way as any other private party by waiving the
government’s
sovereign
immunity.238
The
federal
government has sovereign immunity by default, but
Congress went out of its way to amend CERCLA to clarify its
application to the federal government.239 Enabling the
federal government to dodge liability through the bare legal
title defense is contrary to the specific provisions of CERCLA
that allocate liability to the federal government.240

234. See Chevron Mining v. United States, 863 F.3d 1261, 1275 (10th Cir.
2017) (analyzing the government’s bare legal title argument).
235. See id. (discussing how the indicia of ownership test requires rights
beyond a party’s rights as title holder).
236. See id. at 845 (finding that active participating is not a requirement for
liability).
237. See Nurad, Inc. v. Wiliam E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 846 (4th
Cir. 1992).
238. See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s
waiver of sovereign immunity).
239. See id. (explaining the SARA amendments to CERCLA).
240. See id. (discussing Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity).
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C. The Government Cannot Argue a Defense Outside of the
Statutory Language

Third, the federal government should not be able to
create a defense not statutorily prescribed by CERCLA. Since
its enactment, courts have construed CERCLA’s strict
liability framework to attach liability to any party against
whom a prima facie case of liability is found, subject only to
defenses enumerated in the statute.241 Upon its initial
enactment, CERCLA provided only three defenses a party
could assert to avoid strict liability.242 These defenses
allowed a liable party to evade liability if the release or
threatened release of the hazardous substance was caused by
an act of god, an act of war, or the act or omission of a third
party with which a PRP had no contractual relationship.243
Since its enactment, Congress has further amended
CERCLA to limit or eliminate liability for certain categories
of PRPs to reflect its concerns that the strict liability
framework might lead to inequitable results in certain
situations.244
In 1996, Congress enacted The Asset Conservation,
Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of
1996,245 which protected trustees and other fiduciaries from
241. See, e.g., Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Century Indem. Co., 559 F.3d 57, 60 (1st
Cir. 2009) (“Liability under CERCLA is strict as well as joint and
several.”); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 413 (D. N.J. 1991)
(“[U]nder section 107. . . PRPs have joint and several strict liability for
all response costs . . . subject only to the defenses’ in section 107(b).”).
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2012) (listing the act of god, act of war, and act
or omission of a third party defenses).
243. Id.
244. See Sudhir L. Burgaard, Landowner Defenses to CERCLA Liability,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_p
ractice_series/landowner_defenses_to_cercla_liability.html (last visited Jan. 9,
2018) (addressing concerns that CERCLA’s strict liability scheme could cause
inequitable results with respect to hazardous substance disposal activities,
Congress further established defenses and exclusions from liability for innocent
landowners, bona fide prospective purchasers, and contiguous property owners
(collectively, “the landowner liability defenses”)) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
245. Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 2501–2505, 110 Stat. at 3009-462-469 (1996), codified at
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personal liability beyond their personal assets.246 Next, in
1999, the Superfund Recycling Equity Act247 created an
exemption from liability for generators and transporters of
recyclable scrap.248 Additionally, Congress specifically
amended CERCLA to express its discomfort with what has
been viewed as the harsh effects of strict, retroactive, and
joint and several liability as applied to “innocent”
landowners.249 Again in 2002, Congress established an
exclusion from liability for innocent landowners,250 bona fide
prospective purchasers,251 and contiguous property owners252
(together known as the “landowner liability defenses”) to
specifically alleviate concerns that CERCLA’s legislative
scheme would lead to “inequitable results” for certain
landowners.253
Parties subject to CERCLA liability have only the
defenses enumerated in the statute.254 Because the bare legal
title defense is not a defense specifically listed in CERCLA,
courts should reject it. One of the most important rules of
statutory construction is the rule that the expression of one
idea is the exclusion of another, or expresssio unius est
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(2), 9607(n), 6991(b) (h) (9)).
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 9706(n) (discussing the extent of liability for a fiduciary).
247. Id. § 9627.
248. Id. § 9627.
249. See Burgaard, supra note 244 (addressing concerns that CERCLA’s strict
liability scheme could cause inequitable results with respect to hazardous
substance disposal activities, Congress further established defenses and
exclusions from liability for innocent landowners, bona fide prospective
purchasers, and contiguous property owners (collectively, “the landowner liability
defenses.”)).
250. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607 (b)(3), 9601(65) (providing an exception for a party that
purchased a piece of contaminated knowledge without of the existing
contamination and had no involvement in the contamination).
251. See id. § 9601(40) (defining bona fide purchaser).
252. See id. § 9607(q) (providing an exception for contiguous property owners).
253. See Burgaard, supra note 244 (describing the rationale for the landowner
exceptions).
254. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012) (providing that PRPs are subject to
CERCLA liability “notwithstanding any other provisions or rule of law, and
subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section”).
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excuseo alterius. This canon of statutory construction has
been applied in the strict liability framework.255 For example,
in Laird v. Railroad,256 the court held that a statute
providing one defense is meant to exclude the application of
all other.257 Applying this rule of construction to CERCLA,
courts should exclude any defense not specifically
enumerated in the statute. To allow parties to argue a
defense outside of the Act would run contrary to one of the
canons of statutory construction and render the exceptions to
liability in the statute essentially meaningless.
In addition, Congress has been very responsive in amending
CERCLA to be “equitable” by adding defenses to CERCLA’s
liability provisions; yet, Congress has not at any point suggested
that the federal government should be sheltered from CERCLA
liability.258 If Congress wants to add a governmental liability
defense to CERCLA, they have the power to amend the statute. If
courts were to allow the bare legal title argument, they would
essentially be creating a judicially created defense, but it is
Congress’s job, and not the judicial branch, to amend CERCLA as
they see fit. As one court pointed out when interpreting CERCLA:
While it may be true that application of the principles in this
case by other courts could lead to the imposition of broad
liability on the government, that circumstance cannot influence
our result as we cannot amend CERCLA by judicial fiat. Rather,
our approach must be the as that of the Supreme Court when
responding to an argument that the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was being applied too
broadly: this defect—if defect it is—is inherent in the statute as
written, and its correction must lie with Congress.259

255. See Laird v. Railroad, 62 N.H. 254, 267 (1883) (demonstrating the
application of the rule to a strict liability framework).
256. Id.
257. See id. (holding that the defense of contributory negligence was not
available under the statute in question).
258. See Burgaard, supra note 244 (discussing Congress’ implementation of
the CERCLA “landowner defenses”).
259. FMC Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 846 (3d Cir.
1994) (en banc).
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D. Bare Legal Title Blurs the Owner-Operator Distinction in
CERCLA
Next, the bare legal title defense should be rejected because to
do otherwise would make superfluous the “owner” and “operator”
distinction within the statutory language of the Act. Since
CERCLA’s enactment, courts have struggled to interpret
ownership liability because many courts fail to distinguish
between the two distinct categories of owner and operator, focusing
instead on an owner’s ability to control the contamination on the
property.260 However, owner and operator provide separate bases
for liability: operator liability is a direct liability premised on a
party’s activities at a contaminated site261 while ownership
liability is an indirect liability based on what can often be a party’s
passive role at a contaminated site.262 Accepting the federal
government’s bare legal title argument blurs the distinction
between two distinct categories of liable parties.263 Both Chevron
Mining and El Paso Natural Gas support clearer lines between the
owner and operator categories of PRPs,264 and courts should follow
260. See Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and Operator Analysis
Under CERCLA: Finding Order in the Chaos of Pervasive Control, 72 WASH. U. L.
REV. 223, 235 (1994) (explaining the confusion between owner and operator
liability in CERCLA); Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the
“Erosion” of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 259, 300
(1992) (“[C]ourts typically connect the terms as a single phrase—‘owner or
operator’—and fail to distinguish between the grounds supporting the imposition
of liability upon the two categories of potentially responsible parties.”).
261. Questions surrounding operator liability most often arises in situations
involving corporate liability. See Indirect Owner / Operator Liability Under
CERCLA, FINDLAW, https://corporate.findlaw.com/law-library/indirect-owneroperator-liability-under-cercla.html (last visited May 7, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review) (“The majority of courts which have addressed
the issue of operator liability have analyzed whether a parent or sister
corporation or other person exercised sufficient control over the related
corporation or its facility to be considered an operator of the facility with the
attendant liability under §9607(a)(1) or (a)(2).”).
262. See id. (discussing owner and operator liability for corporations).
263. See Perry & Wightman, supra note 228 (“[T]he Friedland test runs the
risk of collapsing the “owner” and “operator” categories clearly delineated in
CERCLA.”).
264. See Chevron Mining, 864 F.3d at 274 (distinguishing between the term
owner and operator within CERCLA).
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these cases’ rationale in rejecting the bare legal title argument to
draw
the
distinction
between
federally-owned
and
federally-controlled properties.
The courts should distinguish between owners and operators
of a facility because the language of CERCLA itself indicates a
distinction between the two categories. In Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe v. Shell Oil Corp.,265 the Supreme Court, in determining
CERCLA liability, began by looking at the language of the
statute.266 CERCLA defines “owner and operator” as any party
“who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated” the site in question.267 By using the word “or” to separate
the words “owner” and “operator,” the statute suggests a
distinction between the two words.268 CERCLA’s statutory
framework as a whole also indicates a distinction between the two
categories.269 The “National Contingency Plan” section of
CERCLA270 enables the President to defer listing an eligible site
on the NPL if the President determines that “deferral would not be
appropriate because the State, as an owner or operator or a
significant contributor of hazardous substances to the facility, is a
potentially responsible party.”271 Again, the word “or” is placed
between the words “owner” and “operator,” supporting the
proposition courts should treat owner and operator as two
distinguishable categories of liable parties.
Since it seems clear that “owners” and “operators” should be
treated as separate categories of liable parties under CERCLA, it
is important to understand the meaning of each category within
the statute. Turning first to the “operator” category of liability,
[A]n operator is simply someone who directs the workings of,
manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility. . . . [A]n operator
must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related
265. 556 U.S. 1870 (2009).
266. See id. 1877–78 (determining whether the defendant should qualify as
an arranger and, if so, liable for the cleanup as a PRP).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2012).
268. See Chevron Mining, 863 F.3d at 1274 (differentiating between owners
and operators in CERCLA).
269. See, e.g., 42. U.S.C. § 9605(h)(1) (2012) (distinguishing between liable
parties that are owners versus those that are operators).
270. See id. § 9605 (providing for a presidential national contingency plan).
271. Id. § 9605(h)(1).
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to pollution, that is, operations having do with the leakage or
disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with
environmental regulations.272

In order to determine operator liability, courts apply an
“indicia of control” test premised on the operator’s control of a
site.273 This makes it so that operator liability extends only to a
party that exerts some control over the contaminated site or who
has the authority to control the handling and disposal of the
hazardous substances.274
Equating an operator of a site to someone who has the ability
to control a site makes logical sense based upon the common sense
and legal understanding of an operator.275 On the other hand,
determining ownership liability by examining the amount of
control a party, as the federal government argues should be the
case, would make it so there is no difference between the two
categories. In addition, construing ownership liability based on
control seems illogical based on the ordinary meaning of the
word.276 The “owner” of a piece of land is commonly understood as
the entity holding title to the land.277 Moreover, the dictionary,
272. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66 (1998).
273. See id. (showing that a finding of CERCLA operator liability is premised
on control).
274. See K.C.1986 Ltd. Partnership v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir.
2007).
275. See Owen T. Smith, The Expansive Scope of Liable Parties Under
CERCLA, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 821, 832 (2012) (“Under CERCLA, operator status
is accorded to anyone exercising control over activities at a site where hazardous
materials have been released.”).
276. The Supreme Court indicated that if the statutory definition of a
provision within CERCLA are unclear, courts should give the “the phrase its
ordinary meaning.” Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 611 (looking to the “common
parlance,” or the words as found in the dictionary, to determine the meaning or
arranger liability). See also United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S.
128, 136 (2007) (applying the plain meaning to interpret the word “may” within
CERCLA).
277. See Dustin M. Gazier, A Game of Old Maid: The Ninth Circuit
Establishes When the Owner-Operator is Determined for CERCLA Liability in
California v. Hearthside Residential Corp., 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 126 (2011)
(discussing the plain meaning of the term “owner” within CERCLA); see also J.B.
Ruhl, The Plight of the Passive Past Owner: Defining the Limits of Superfund
Liability, 45 S.W. L.J. 1129, 1133 (1991) (detailing the liability of a passive owner,
stating that “past owners are liable under CERCLA if they owned property when
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which courts turn to when the statutory language is ambiguous,
defines “legal owner” as “one who has legal title to property”278 and
“own” to be to “have or hold as property.”279 Thus, both the plain
meaning and dictionary meaning of the word supports the
interpretation that an owner is merely someone who owns title to
property.
Other sections of CERCLA support this proposition. For one,
the expedited settlement provision of CERCLA states that an
expedited settlement may be appropriate when a potentially
responsible party “(i) is the owner of the real property on or in
which the facility is located; (ii) did not conduct or permit the
generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any
hazardous substance at the facility; and (iii) did not contribute to
the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance at a
facility through any action or omission.”280 This Part provides three
distinct requirements to obtain an expedited settlement, one of
which is the owner of the land while another is conducting or
contributing to contamination, indicating that a person who owns
property and a person who actually controls or contributes to the
contamination are separate bases of liability.281
Interpreting CERCLA in a way that premises liability for
owner and operators on control makes the statute superfluous.282
Because operator liability is established based on ability to control,
courts should not also construe ownership liability to be based on
control. The federal government, by asserting the bare legal title
hazardous substances leaked . . . into the environment regardless of whether they
committed affirmative acts to cause the leak or spill” (emphasis added)).
https://www.merriam278. Legal
Owner,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
webster.com/dictionary/owner (last updated Feb. 28, 2019) (last visited May 7,
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
https://www.merriam279. Own,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
webster.com/dictionary/own (last updated Feb. 28, 2019) (last visited Apr. 16,
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
280. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (2012).
281. See Chevron Mining v. United States, 863 F.3d 1261, 1265 n.12 (10th
Cir. 2017) (discussing the need for a distinction between owner and operator
liability).
282. See id. (“Differentiating among owners, operators, and significant
contributors demonstrates that a person may be considered an owner for purposes
of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA) liability without having contributed in any way to hazardous
substances.”).
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defense, argues that something more, or control over the property,
is required for ownership liability to attach and that holding title
without an ability to control is not enough.283 However, both owner
and operator liability cannot be predicated on the ability of a party
to control the contaminated site.284 Allowing both owner and
operator liability on control renders the difference between the
“owner” and “operator” groups meaningless.285
E. Bare Legal Title is Inconsistent with Other CERCLA Case Law
Accepting the bare legal title argument is also inconsistent
with prior interpretations of CERCLA’s liability framework. While
few cases specifically address liability of the federal government as
a legal title holder to unpatented mining claims, the issue of when
ownership liability attaches to the title holder generally frequently
arises. A common scenario in which courts encounter this issue is
in the context of a landlord who has leased a piece of property to a
tenant who, in turn, contaminates the site. A landlord who leases
a piece of property to a tenant can be analogized to the federal
government granting a third party the right to use public lands
through an unpatented mining claim.286 In both situations, a third
party tenant has a rights of possession and control over the land in
questions.287
283. See Chevron Mining, 863 F.3d at 1274 (discussing the distinction
between federal owner and operated properties).
284. See id. (“The distinction between federally owned and federally
controlled properties indicates that ownership and control are independent
inquiries—the United States may own a facility without controlling that
facility.”).
285. See Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 71 F. Supp. 360, 367
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (“The test for ‘ownership’ liability under CERCLA . . . has
become similar to [the] test for 'operator' liability under CERCLA.”).
286. See Mining Claims: What They Are and the Different Types, 1881
LEASING INVESTMENTS, http://www.1881.com/minedef.htm (last visited March 1,
2018) (describing an unpatented mining claim as a lease from the government
with no ownership rights conveyed) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
287. See id. (detailing the rights of a third party and the United States on a
mining claim).
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In landlord-lessee cases, courts routinely hold that any entity
with legal title to a property is liable as an owner under CERCLA,
regardless of control of the property.288 Courts have interpreted
“owner” to include lessors, lessees, and sublessors.289 Lessors, as
title owners of the land, are liable as owners, despite often having
no control over the lessee’s actions.290 For example, in United
States v. Argent Corp.,291 the defendant, a property owner who
leased a warehouse to the contaminating party, attempted to
evade the CERCLA liability scheme because he had no control over
lessee’s operations or the contamination.292 However, the court
held the lessor liable, finding that the Act’s legislative history
“shows a deliberate omission [from CERCLA] which would have
required participation in management or in operation as a
prerequisite to owner liability.”293
There are, admittedly, several differences between the
relationship of the federal government to an unpatented mining
claimant and a landlord and tenant. Namely, the federal
288. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 1988)
(“[T]he site-owners contended that they were innocent absentee landlords
unaware of and unconnected to the waste disposal activities that took place on
their land . . .”); United States v. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d 385, 397 (D.N.J. 2000)
(“Section 107(a)(1) of CERLCA imposes liability on current owners of a site even
if the disposal of the substances occurred before the commencement of ownership
and the owner has not been shown to have caused a release.”); United States v.
Union Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 356, 395 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (holding the past owners
and operators of a hazardous waste site liable where the hazardous substances
were disposed of during their “tenure as owners and operators”); Western Props.
Serv. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 688 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding a current
landowner who did not contribute to the contamination of the land and did not
fall under the innocent purchaser defense liable for cleanup costs), abrogated by
Kotrous v. Goss-Jewett Co., 523 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2008).
289. See, e.g., United States v. S.C. Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp.
984, 1003 (D.S.C. 1986) (explaining how a lessee essentially stands in the shoes
of the property owner and is liable as such), aff’d in part and vacated in part by
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
290. See, e.g., United States v. Argent Corp., No. CIV 83-0523-BB, 1984 WL
2567, at *2 (D.N.M. May 4, 1984) (finding precedent to hold a landlord lessor
liable as an owner under CERCLA).
291. No. CIV 83-0523-BB, 1984 WL 2567 (D.N.M. May 4, 1984).
292. See id. at *1 (“Bishop argues that his mere ownership of the Rio Rancho
land and building, without any attendant connection to the Argent Corp. business
operated thereon, does not make him an ‘owner’ within the contemplation of
CERCLA.”).
293. Id. at *2.
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government and unpatented mining claimant do not enter into an
explicit agreement (such as a lease), nor does the claimant pay for
use of the mining lands (so there is no rent paid on the lands).294
However, the provisions of the General Mining Law define a
miner’s rights to locate and mine on lands much like a lease295
because the General Mining Law governs the parameters of the
holder of an unpatented mining claim’s rights land much like a
lease.296 Specifically, the statute states that lands subject to
unpatented mining claims are “free and open to exploration and
purchase, and the land in which such deposits are found, to
occupation and purchase by citizens of the United States, under
regulation prescribed by law, and according to local customs and
rules of miners.”297

Beyond the lessor-lessee scope, property owners are
routinely found liable for contamination on property that
they hold fee title to, regardless of whether they played a role
in the contamination or if they had knowledge that the
contamination was occurring.298 As such, finding the federal
government liable as a PRP despite its control over the
hazardous substance disposal is in line with case law
allocating CERCLA liability to a landowner that was
unaware of or was not involved in the contamination of a
hazardous site.299 Holding title to the contaminated site in
question is enough to make a party liable as an owner under
CERCLA.300
294. See 30 U.S.C. § 26 (2012) (outlining the locators’ rights of possession and
enjoyment).
295. See id. § 28 (listing regulations that govern mining on public lands).
296. Id.
297. Id. § 22.
298. See Laurence S. Kirsch & Geraldine E. Edens, Federal Environmental
Liability, in Environmental Aspects of Real Estate and Commercial Transactions
7 (James B. Wilkin ed., 2004) (“A property owner or tenant may be held liable for
contamination even if that person did not deposit hazardous substances on the
site or knowingly or negligently allow unsafe conditions to persist there.”).
299. See id. at 7–8 (discussing the allocation of CERCLA responsibility to
landowners).
300. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 838
(4th Cir. 1992) (holding even a short-term title holder as an owner for CERCLA
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F. CERCLA’s Apportionment Phase Covers Equitable Concerns
Lastly, holding the federal government liable as a PRP is in
line with the goals of the liability phase of a CERCLA action. The
liability phase of CERCLA is meant to include as many PRPs as
possible, in part because of the deterrent goals of the Act discussed
above.
A contribution action allows a court hearing the suit to
“allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable
factors as the court determines are appropriate.”301 While
CERCLA allocates a broad joint and several liability over PRPs,
after cleanup costs have incurred, contribution actions among the
jointly liable allow PRPs opportunity to allocate responsibility
among themselves.302 Precluding the federal government from
liability at CERCLA’s front-end liability phase does not make
sense in light of the purposes of the statute’s apportionment phase.
The Act’s first stage of attaching liability is meant to provide
sweeping liability to all involved parties, even those tangentially
involved, in order to encourage the careful handling of hazardous
wastes while the allocation phase is meant to take into account
equitable factors to distribute cleanup costs among PRPs.303 Courts
should not preclude the federal government from CERCLA liability
based on the federal government’s bare legal title argument;
instead, courts should continue to enforce sweeping ownership
liability and concern themselves with equitable issues at the
allocation phase of litigation.
In Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United
States,304 the Supreme Court for the first time addressed the issue
of apportionment of harm under CERCLA.305 While each PRP
liability purposes).
301. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2012).
302. See Percival et al., supra note 223, at 444 (introducing the allocation of
liability between PRPs under CERCLA).
303. See JACOB S. WOODARD, FINDING A SAFE HARBOR FROM ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE PURCHASERS
1
(2014),
https://www.morrisonsund.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Finding-aSafe-Harbor-from-Environmental-Liability-for-Commercial-Real-EstatePurchasers.pdf (describing the liability phase as imposing liability upon four
broad classes of responsible persons).
304. 556 U.S. 599 (2009).
305. See id. at 613 (addressing whether there should be joint and several
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could potentially bear liability for the entire cleanup at a
contaminated site, Burlington Northern allowed for the
apportionment between parties based on each party’s contribution
to the contamination.306 In practice, courts rarely allocated liability
equally between all of the potentially responsible parties.307 When
multiple owners or operators are PRPs for a contaminated site,
courts have used a variety of methods to determine how to
apportion liability. Factors considered when determining the
allocation of costs include the knowledge of the party, the relative
fault of each party, and contractually allocated responsibilities.308
CERCLA’s statutory scheme is meant to provide sweeping
liability to anyone involved, however remotely, in the disposal of
hazardous substances.309 A holder of bare legal title may only be
liable for a small portion of remediation costs as a matter of equity
at the apportionment phase. However, this should not preclude
liability of any party, including the federal government, at the
liability phase of a case because CERCLA’s liability scheme
“requires any consideration of the extent and kind of an owner’s
involvement in hazardous substance production and disposal be
made at the second stage of the CERCLA liability inquiry, rather
than the first.”310 Thus, the amount of liability is meant to be
determined at the allocation phase of the CERCLA liability
scheme.311 An owner should not be entirely precluded from liability

liability for all of the government’s response costs or whether the court should
apportion the damages).
306. See id. at 599 (holding the defendants liable for only a percentage of the
government’s response costs).
307. See Kirsch & Geraldine, supra note 298, at 7–8 (discussing the allocation
process between landowners).
308. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 617 (discussing relevant factors to
apportioning liability).
309. See id. (“[T]he wide net cast by CERCLA can snare a large number of
PRPs at a given site. There are usually past and present owners and, in some
cases, large numbers of ‘generator’ PRPs.”).
310. See Chevron Mining v. United States, 863 F.3d 1261, 1277 (10th Cir.
2017).
311. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2012) (laying out CERCLA’s contribution
framework).
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but instead should have the extent of their fault determined when
assessing the allocation of costs between the parties.
V. The Federal Government Should Be Held Liable as an Owner
Allocating CERCLA liability to the federal government is not
a new concept. Congress made it clear that strict liability should
apply to the United States through Congress’ express waiver of
sovereign immunity.312 As one court expressed, “[If] the
government engaged in the type of activity that normally would
cause a private party to be liable as an ‘owner,’ ‘operator,’ or
‘arranger for disposal,’”313 then the federal government will be held
liable to the same extent as a private party.314

Despite this understanding, the United States has made
numerous attempts to elude CERCLA liability.315 The federal
government’s “bare legal title” argument is simply another
attempt by the federal government to escape responsibility
for its role in the contamination of public lands. It is the
federal government requesting that the court give it special
treatment despite holding title to a contaminated site, which
would lead to liability for any other third party.316

312. See id. § 9620 (stating that the United States shall be subject to CERCLA
liability).
313. See United States v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. CV-89-39-BU-PG, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21708, at *15 (D. Mt. Nov. 1, 1994).
314. See id. (rejecting government immunity under CERCLA).
315. See, e.g., id. at *8 (rejecting the government’s claim of sovereign
immunity under CERCLA); Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. ASARCO Inc., 280 F. Supp.
2d 1094, 1125 (D. Idaho 2003) (same). In United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
the United States argued that the defendant’s claims fell outside of CERCLA’s
waiver of sovereign immunity because the title held by the government to
unpatented mining claims has “no private counterpart.” Atl. Richfield, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21708, at *9. However, the court found that “[if] the government
engaged in the type of activity that normally would cause a private party to be
liable as an ‘owner,’ ‘operator,’ or ‘arranger for disposal,’ then sovereign immunity
does not apply.” Id. at *15. The question “is not whether the United States is
immune from liability when it acts in a sovereign capacity under section 120(a),
but whether its activities—however characterized—cause it to fall within
CERCLA’s definition of an owner, operator, or party that has arranged for
disposal of hazardous substances.” Id. at *13–14.
316. If a private party held title to a piece of contaminated mining property
as the government holds title to an unpatented mining claim, the third party
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But, in fact, extending liability to the federal government
for its title ownership of an unpatented mining claim is in
accord with a long line of cases holding that the federal
government can, and should, be held liable as an owner under
CERCLA.317 In some cases, the United States has been liable
for its role as an owner of equipment at facilities that were
used for hazardous waste disposal318 and in other the United
States has been held liable as an owner based upon its
ownership of federal facilities.319 Courts have repeatedly
made clear that the federal government can only escape
CERCLA liability when it engages in a cleanup in its
regulatory capacity or falls into one of the Act’s enumerated
defenses.320 Finding the federal government liable under
CERCLA is by no means a new phenomenon.
It is true that the term “owner” has never been clearly
defined under the Act, and in turn, courts have had to
interpret what parties should fall under the ownership
category.321 But this lack of definite interpretation of “owner”
would undoubtedly be found liable as an owner under CERCLA.
317. See 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (2012) (stating that the United States shall be
subject to CERCLA liability in the same manner as a private counterpart).
318. See, e.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 707,
708 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding the United States liable as the owner of equipment
that discharge hazardous materials in the surrounding environment). In this
case, the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest leased equipment from the United
States to produce the pesticide DDT. The land and ground surrounding the
facility became contaminated with chemicals used in the manufacturing process
of DDT. In a contribution action, the court held the United States liable as an
owner under CERCLA. Id.
319. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 846 (3d Cir.
1994) (en banc) (holding the federal government liable as an owner, operator, and
arranger under CERCLA). In this case, a rayon manufacturer sued the U.S.
Department of Commerce for costs incurred in the removal of hazardous
materials from a rayon manufacturing plant. The Department of Commerce
owned certain facilities and equipment within the plant. Based on this, the
government was held jointly and severally liable for the costs of the required clean
up. Id.
320. See United States v. Skipper, 781 F. Supp. 1106, 1110–11 (E.D.N.C.
1991).
321. See Susan Peticolas & Paul M. Hauge, Liability—Potentially Responsible
Parties, in 50A NEW JERSEY PRACTICE SERIES BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK
(2018– 2019 ed.) (providing an overview of liability for potentially responsible
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is not limited to cases involving the United States, and
instead arises in any lawsuit in which a parties PRP status
comes about from the party holding title to the contaminated
piece of land. The breadth of CERCLA ownership liability has
been interpreted broadly to include parties beyond legal title
owners subject only to one of the enumerated defenses in the
statute.322 Yet, there are no exceptions in CERCLA in
regards to title holders of a contaminated site; on the
contrary, former landowners are routinely held to be a PRP
liable for the cleanup costs at a contaminated site despite the
fact that they did not in any way participate in the disposal
of the hazardous substances.323 As such, for purposes of
CERCLA liability the federal government should be liable as
an owner, a term that includes title holders, regardless of any
additional “indicia of ownership.” Holding a record fee
titleholder liable under CERCLA despite any control or
participation in the contamination is a well-established
principle. Courts should rely on prior case law interpreting
ownership liability to logically extend liability to the United
States for its role in the contamination of public lands. Hence,
courts should uniformly reject the federal government’s bare
legal title defense.

parties under CERCLA).
322. See, e.g., Organic Chemical Site PRP Grp. v. Total Petroleum Inc., 58 F.
Supp. 2d 755, 766 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (granting summary judgment in part finding
that the defendant, Total Petroleum, Inc., was not liable under CERCLA). In this
case, a group of PRPs brought a lawsuit against Total Petroleum, Inc., a company
that once owned an interest in a superfund site. Total held title to the
contaminated site as a land contract vendor. Total filed for summary judgment
and the court held that Total fell under the security interest exception of CERCLA
because its title in the land was only held as a security interest. In some cases,
courts have gone so far as to hold landowners liable when they took no action to
prevent the further contamination of property.
323. Southfund Partners III v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1369,
1377 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that a disposal requires
an affirmative act by an owner of land). The opinion states that “such a narrow
interpretation of the term ‘disposal’ would permit a landowner to contaminate the
environment by ignoring open drums of hazardous materials on his property
while rainwater displaced the materials and caused them to spill onto the
ground.” Id.
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A. Policy Implications of Expanding Governmental Liability
While the federal government has only raised the “bare legal
title” defense in the context of mining activity on public lands,
CERCLA liability for the federal government as an owner should
extend beyond the context of unpatented mining claims. Courts
should reject the federal government’s bare legal title defense and
apply strict liability whenever the federal government holds fee
title to contamination on public lands. Designating broad liability
to the federal government is a powerful weapon in incentivizing
the United States to prioritize environmental protection when
authorizing the development on federal lands.324

In the United States, there has long been a history of the
tension between preserving public lands and allowing for the
commercial exploration of commodity resources.325 With over
610 million acres, or 30% of the total land area in the United
States, owned by the federal government, it is only natural
that there are competing interests on federal lands.326 Within
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), just one of the many
federal agencies that administer public lands, lands are

324. See, e.g., MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS: LESSONS
TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 421 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad
eds., 2007) (discussing the deterrent effects of CERCLA).
325. See THE WILDERNESS SOC’Y, AMERICAN PUBLIC LANDS–THESE LANDS ARE
YOUR
LAND
1
https://wilderness.org/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheet%20America%27s%20Pub
lic%20Lands%20.pdf (discussing public land management in the United States);
The Editorial Bd., The Looting of America’s Public Lands, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2017, at SRB (“The last few weeks have been particularly brutal for
conservationists and, indeed, anyone who believes that big chunks of America’s
public lands, however rich they may be in commercial resources, are best left in
their natural state.”).
326. See CASSANDRA J. HARTNETT, ANDREA L. SEVESTON & ERIC J. FORTE,
FUNDAMENTALS OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION: MINING, FINDING, EVALUATING,
AND USING GOVERNMENT RESOURCES (2nd ed. 2016) (discussing management of
lands controlled by the federal government). The federal estate also extends to
energy and mineral resources located below the ground, including about 700
million acres of federal subsurface mineral estates. See KATIE HOOVER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42329, FEDERAL LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES: OVERVIEW
AND SELECTED ISSUES FOR THE 113TH CONGRESS 2 (2014) (summarizing the
complex and issues surround “how much and which land the government should
own, and how lands and resources should be used and managed”).
FROM
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designated for a myriad of uses, including renewable and
conventional energy development, livestock grazing, timber
production, hunting and fishing, recreational actives, and
conservation.327
The history of mining on federally owned lands in the
United States exemplifies the tension between preservation
and development and the ultimate consequences of
developing lands without factoring in environmental
protection.328 For the last twenty years, fossil fuels—
petroleum, natural gas, and coal—have provided more than
eighty percent of the United States’ total energy
consumption.329 And while coal consumption may be
decreasing in the United States,330 the energy demands in
the country are only increasing. The United States
Department of Energy predicts that this energy demand will
be met by the increased production of renewable energy,
namely wind and solar energy.331
While the use of renewable energy sources provides a
cleaner alternative than the use of fossil fuels, many of the
same land use concerns that arise in conventional energy

327. Neil Kornze, Director, U.S. Dep’t of Interior House Comm. on Oversight
and Gov’t Reform, Statement on the Recent Management of Oil and Gas Lease
Sales by the Bureau of Land Management (Mar. 23, 2016).
328. See R. Timothy McCrum, The Emerging Judicial Recognition of
Government Liability and under Superfund, CROWELL MORNING (Nov. 1998),
https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/Publications/Articles/The-EmergingJudicial-Recognition-Of-Government-Liability-Under-Superfund (last visited
Mar. 1, 2018) (stating that the potential for financial liability is “present at a wide
variety of sites ranging from historic abandoned mines on federal lands to
Department of Defense and Department of Energy manufacturing and research
facilities”).
329. See Fossil Fuels Still Dominate U.S. Energy Consumption Despite Recent
Market Share Decline, U.S. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ADMIN. (July 1, 2016),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=26912 (last visited Mar. 1,
2018) (detailing trends in U.S. energy production).
330. See Century-long Decline for U.S. Coal Mining Jobs, ENERGY TREND
TRACKER (Jan. 2017), http://www.energytrendtracker.org/2017/01/century-longdecline-for-u-s-coal-jobs/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2018) (compiling data on the decline
in the U.S. Coal industry).
331. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 WITH
PROJECTIONS
TO
2035,
at
2
(2012),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/
aeo/pdf/0383(2012).pdf.
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sources also arise in renewable energy projects.332 The
federal government has already encouraged development of
renewable energy on public lands, but this development
poses the threat of destroying natural landscapes and
resources and contaminating public lands.333 In allowing
third parties to again develop the public lands with the
potential to have devastating consequences, it is imperative
that the federal government takes an active role in
supervising the third parties. If federal courts would
uniformly acknowledge the federal government as strictly
liable as an owner of unpatented mining claims, the federal
government will be put on notice that it will be responsible
for the contamination of public lands when they allow third
parties to develop public lands. By heightening the threat of
CERCLA liability to the federal government, the government
will more likely carefully weigh the costs and benefits of
allowing third party development at federal lands. At the
very least, the federal government will likely insist on
conditions to the development and ensure that proper
hazardous waste disposal practice are met to prevent
CERCLA response costs in the future.334
Heightening the federal government’s liability profile should
not be viewed as a way to make the federal government carry the
burden of remediation costs. Rather, expanding the federal
government’s CERCLA liability should be perceived as a route to
effectively prevent the contamination of public lands in the future.

332. See Carolyn Miller, The Transformation of Blight: Fixing the CERCLA
Lessee Problem to Develop Renewable Energy, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1267, 1287
(2014) (providing insight on the contaminated sites will accommodate the
increased demand for renewable energy).
333. See id. (raising concerns that the development of energy resources will
lead to increased contamination of public lands).
334. See Perry & Wightman, supra note 228 (“[G]iven the federal
government’s heightened liability profile, it may insist on more conditions in
authorizing the use of public land to conduct mining operations, as a hedge
against future liability of any cleanup costs.”).
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VI. Conclusion
CERCLA is an expansive remedial statute that holds
responsible parties liable for their actions at contaminated waste
sites. Yet, despite the broad remedial and deterrent goals of the
statute, the federal government has attempted to evade CERCLA
liability for its ownership role as the “bare legal titleholder” at
contaminated mining sites subject to unpatented mining claims.
The problem with the government’s “bare legal title” argument is
that it contravenes the goals and strict liability framework of the
Act. Additionally, if federal agencies do not take responsibility for
their role in environmental contamination, the limited funds in the
Superfund Trust will be further stretched, impeding the
remediation of contaminated waste sites in the United States.
Given the implications of the bare legal title defense, courts
should recognize that Chevron Mining and El Paso Natural Gas
were correctly decided and hold the federal government liable as
an owner at mining sites. As the Tenth Circuit acknowledged in
Chevron Mining, owner under CERCLA “at the very least mean
the person who holds legal title to a piece of land.” By expanding
the federal government’s liability profile, courts are establishing a
precedent that will deter the United States from allowing
contamination on public lands in the future.

